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S H A R O N B . J A C O B S
The Statutory Separation of Powers
abstract. Separation of powers forms the backbone of our constitutional democracy. But it
also operates as an underappreciated structural principle in subconstitutional domains. This Arti-
cle argues that Congress constructs statutory schemes of separation, checks, and balances through
its delegations to administrative agencies. Like its constitutional counterpart, the “statutory sepa-
ration of powers” seeks to prevent the dominance of factions and ensure policy stability. But sep-
arating and balancing statutory authority is a delicate business: the optimal balance is difficult to
calibrate ex ante, the balance is unstable, and there are risks that executive agencies in particular
might seek expansion of their authority vis-à-vis their independent counterparts.
By explicating the architecture of statutory separation of powers, this Article explores both
how statutory separation of powers can facilitate resistance to the executive and how the executive
might weaponize particular statutory entanglements in pursuit of policy dominance. Presidents
from both parties unapologetically leverage administrative agencies to achieve policy goals. The
current administration is no exception: it has rolled back emissions limits previously promulgated
by the Environmental Protection Agency, refocused immigration policy on enforcement and bor-
der security through changes at the Department of Homeland Security, and leaned on the Depart-
ment of Energy to prop up the ailing coal industry. This last set of efforts has, to date, been re-
buffed by other federal administrative actors. This is no accident. Congress set up the existing
federal balance of energy authorities in the wake of a previous attempt by the executive to dominate
energy policy. But because of the administration’s willingness to use statutory checks as a sword
rather than a shield, the interagency balance of authority has come under increasing pressure.
The Article concludes with recommendations for how Congress, agencies, and the judiciary
might mitigate these tendencies and preserve the statutory separation of powers as a meaningful
safeguard against the perils of concentrated executive policy-making authority.
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introduction
The nature and extent of presidential power over administrative agencies is
a central question in administrative law. The case in favor of expansive presiden-
tial control is grounded in the democratic accountability and efficiency that the
President can bring to agency action.1 Opponents of strong presidential control,
however, are less convinced that presidential involvement yields true accounta-
bility or transparency.2 Presidential involvement may also undermine rather than
promote efficiency, especially when that involvement manifests as painstaking
review of agency action by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).3 Sep-
arately, some worry that Presidents will sometimes interfere with the exercise of
neutral expertise by administrative actors and thwart congressional intent as em-
bodied in agencies’ authorizing statutes.4 As a result, some argue that Presidents
1. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331-32 (2001); see also
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 2 (1994) (citing the values of accountability, coordination, and uniformity in execution of
the laws as reasons to favor a unitary conception of executive power).
2. See, e.g., PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 121-32 (2009).
3. Within OMB, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is responsible for
regulatory review. For critiques of OIRA review, see, for example, Nicholas Bagley & Richard
L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1267-69
(2006), which criticizes OIRA for its overly narrow focus on regulatory costs; and Lisa Schultz
Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Look at the Practice of
Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 49-52 (2006), which critiques OIRA’s lack of trans-
parency, selectivity, and narrow focus on costs based on interviews with agency officials who
have participated in OIRA review. In part due to these downsides, agencies will sometimes go
to great lengths to insulate their rulemaking from OIRA review. See Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-
Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1782-89 (2013). OIRA review has
its supporters as well. For defenses of OIRA’s practices as improving coordination and coher-
ence within administrative policy-making, see Michael A. Livermore, Cost-Benefit Analysis and
Agency Independence, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 609, 613 (2014), which argues that OIRA review can
enhance agency independence; and Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1841-42 (2013), which defends OIRA’s
role and emphasizes its utility in coordinating agency actions.
4. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Presidential Administration: Then and Now, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS,
Fall 2017, at 4, 5. Moreover, even supporters of presidential involvement are aware of the im-
portance of presidential restraint in some contexts. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 1, at 2356-57
(urging presidential restraint as to technical agency actions that depend on scientific method-
ology and conclusions).
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should merely oversee agency action, not substitute their own decisions for those
of agency heads.5
Congress, as the architect of the modern executive branch, can shape and
control presidential power in a given policy domain through its statutory dele-
gations. One important way in which Congress has designed agencies to resist
presidential encroachment is by vesting all administrative authority on a given
matter in an independent, bipartisan commission.6 By preventing the President
from removing the heads of such agencies without cause, Congress eliminates
or at least limits a key source of presidential influence. Other structural determi-
nants of agency independence include multimember structure, partisan balance,
litigation authority, and self-funding mechanisms.7
Congress might also compromise by dividing authorities between agencies
operating at varying degrees of remove from the White House. Such a compro-
mise preserves some of the advantages of executive oversight while preventing
total control by the President within a given policy domain. By dividing statutory
authorities among administrative agencies, and by setting up checks and bal-
ances between them, Congress can influence not only the internal dynamics of
the administrative state but also the relationship between the constitutional
branches of government. Because constitutional architecture inspires these ar-
rangements, this Article names them the “statutory separation of powers.”
5. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Foreword: Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative
Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007) (opining that the President’s role in ordinary admin-
istrative-law contexts is merely to oversee administrative action). Some commentators have
proposed that courts should interpret congressional delegations to agencies as presumptively
excluding presidential involvement unless the statute expressly identifies a presidential role.
See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Power to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 263, 267-69 (2006).
6. See Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (upholding the insulation of
independent committee members from presidential removal); see also Rachel E. Barkow, In-
sulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 26 (2010)
(noting that “insulating agencies from presidential oversight may also protect them from cap-
ture because interest groups can exert pressure on the President to rein in agencies”).
7. See Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agen-
cies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 769 (2013) (identifying six such determinants, including “re-
moval protection, multimember structure, partisan balance requirements, budget and con-
gressional communication authority, litigation authority, and adjudication authority”);
Jennifer L. Selin, What Makes an Agency Independent?, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 971, 974-77 (2015)
(adding quorum requirements, civil-service protections for agency staff, and the existence of
internal Inspector General offices to this list).
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Scholars have recently begun to explore the myriad relationships among
agencies more carefully.8 These relationships are diverse and complex. They pro-
vide opportunities for synergy9 as well as conflict.10 And they have implications
for presidential control over administrative policy. Although Presidents may en-
hance their authority by aggregating the functions of various agencies under cer-
tain conditions,11 the division of policy authority between multiple agencies can
also be a liability for entrepreneurial executives.
This Article incorporates insights from political science and legislative his-
tory to shed light on precisely how and why Congress creates particular statutory
allocations of authority between agencies operating in the same subject area. It
focuses on one particular relationship: that between the Department of Energy
(DOE) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). This relation-
ship was forged in the crucible of dueling external forces: the energy crises of the
1970s and the Watergate scandal.12 It therefore offers a window into Congress’s
design choices in the face of pressure from the White House to centralize and
consolidate federal energy authorities, as well as a countervailing impulse to dif-
fuse power horizontally as a safeguard against executive aggrandizement.
In the mid-1970s, Congress faced a choice. As retribution for the United
States’ support of Israel in the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, Arab oil producers im-
posed an embargo on shipments to the United States.13 The embargo caused
8. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agencies as Adversaries, 105 CALIF. L. REV.
1375, 1375-76 (2017) (focusing on the impact of agency conflict on democratic governance);
Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV.
1131, 1134-35 (2012) (examining interagency coordination); Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and
Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 201-03 (examining
jurisdictional statutes in administrative law); Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 AD-
MIN. L. REV. 181, 182-83 (2011) (discussing duplicative agency delegations); Anne Joseph
O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-
9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1655, 1657-58 (2006) (questioning the call for agency unifica-
tion).
9. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1135, 1136-37 (proposing methods to coordinate agency
action in the face of overlapping and fragmented delegations); Bijal Shah, Congress’s Agency
Coordination, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1961, 1962-65 (2019) (arguing that Congress creates coordi-
nated agency regimes by statute).
10. See Farber & O’Connell, supra note 8, at 1384-85 (celebrating the political, social welfare, and
legitimacy benefits of such conflict).
11. See Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 212-18 (2015) (describing examples
of the presidential combination of legal and other resources allocated to different administra-
tive agencies and concluding that pooling is a significant tool of executive power).
12. See infra Part II.
13. DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY, AND POWER 607-08 (1990).
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widespread gasoline and electricity shortages.14 In response, Presidents Nixon,
Ford, and Carter each sought to consolidate federal energy authority in an exec-
utive agency subject to presidential control.15 The recent emergency lent a sense
of urgency to these actions, which were accompanied by the usual laundry list of
justifications concerning the relative speed, decisiveness, and coordination of the
executive branch.16 President Carter ultimately proposed a new cabinet-level De-
partment of Energy to coordinate federal energy policy.17
But Congress balked. Legislators had no desire to set up “an all-pervasive,
all-powerful czar of energy in this country”18 through legislation. Instead, the
Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977 (DOE Act) divided federal au-
thority over energy between two new agencies: one an executive department, the
other an independent commission. These two agencies, DOE and FERC, were
each granted key powers to shape and regulate federal energy markets. Clark
Byse, who published the authoritative account of the DOE Act,19 was an advocate
of stronger, more centralized executive energy authority. “One is tempted to pro-
test,” Byse wrote of the division of powers between DOE and FERC, “that this
is a hell of a way to wage war: in the sunshine with an eviscerated commanding
general.”20 And yet Congress remained firm.
14. In the 1970s, oil-fired power plants accounted for about twenty percent of fossil-fired electric
power generation in the United States. See Competition Among Fuels for Power Generation
Driven by Changes in Fuel Prices, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 13, 2012),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=7090 [https://perma.cc/G5GA-FN5N].
That percentage declined rapidly in the wake of the oil crisis and is in the low single digits
today. Id.
15. See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., President Gerald R. Ford, Address to the Nation on Energy Programs (May 27, 1975),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/256768 [https://perma.cc/78A6-GF9N] (berating
Congress for doing “nothing positive to end our energy dependence” and vowing “decisive[]”
action, promising to “now do what I can do as President”); President Jimmy Carter, Depart-
ment of Energy Remarks Outlining Proposed Legislation to Create the Department (Mar. 1,
1977), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/242857 [https://perma.cc/W3VE-YW6J]
(emphasizing the speed and cohesion that the new department would bring to energy policy).
17. William V. Thomas, Federal Reorganization and Budget Reform, in 2 EDITORIAL RESEARCH
REPORTS 1977, at 661 (Hoyt Gilman ed., 1977), https://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher
/cqresrre1977090900 [https://perma.cc/S874-T9PM].
18. 123 CONG. REC. 15,279 (1977) (statement of Sen. Glenn).
19. Clark Byse, The Department of Energy Organization Act: Structure and Procedure, 30 ADMIN. L.
REV. 193 (1978).
20. Id. at 200. Byse does not ascribe the congressional reluctance to centralize energy authority to
any particular motivation, though he proposes several. He suggests that a general distrust of
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Debates on the bill were peppered with references to the well-worn concept
of separation of powers and its corollary, checks and balances. Senator Charles
Percy (R-Ill.), the ranking Republican on the Senate Committee on Government
Operations, explained that the legislation set up a “carefully constructed balance
of power between the Secretary and [an independent agency].”21 And the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs’s report indicated their reluctance to give
responsibility for “both proposing and setting [energy] prices” to a single ad-
ministrator, “especially where such person has a multitude of other policy and
administrative responsibilities.”22 Congress also set up checks between the two
agencies, allowing each to serve as a safeguard against policy aggrandizement by
the other.23 Representative Robert McClory (R-Ill.) objected to an early version
of the bill that vested more concentrated authority in DOE by noting that “[o]ur
way of government includes checks and balances and safeguards,” and observing
that the bill was “deficient in failing to provid[e] these safeguards.”24
Congress’s division of responsibility between agencies in the DOE Act, and
its creation of entanglements, or checks, between them, is thus an exemplar of
the statutory separation of powers. The Act’s separation and balancing was in-
spired by its constitutional cousin. It addresses many of the same concerns, in-
cluding the perils of aggregating power in a single actor and the desire to prevent
rapid shifts of power. Rather than concerning itself with the exercise of power in
the federal government as a whole, however, it addresses these concerns in the
context of a single policy domain.
the presidency after Watergate may have contributed to congressional uneasiness, and pro-
poses that the distrust may have also been of President Carter himself, an outsider, and his
team. Id. at 202-03.
21. 123 CONG. REC. 15,278 (1977) (statement of Sen. Percy). In this version of the bill, the Presi-
dent was also permitted to veto the Board’s action if he disapproved. S. 826, 95th Cong.
§ 404(c) (1977). Statements in the record suggest that at least part of the reason for assigning
some responsibilities to an independent agency was fear of executive agency capture. Senator
William Roth (R-Del.) wondered aloud during a hearing on the legislation whether, given
that “the oil company lobbyists were too close to the sources of power involved in decision-
making,” both “during and prior to Watergate,” new legislation consolidating energy policy-
making in the executive might subject that policy-making to special interest influence. De-
partment of Energy Organization Act: Hearings on S. 826 and S. 591 Before the S. Comm. on Gov-
ernmental Affairs, 95th Cong. 486 (1977) (statement of Sen. Roth).
22. S. REP. NO. 95-164, at 37 (1977). Senator Ribicoff (D-Conn.) reiterated these concerns on the
floor. See 123 CONG. REC. 15,275 (1977) (statement of Sen. Ribicoff ).
23. See infra Section II.D.
24. 123 CONG. REC. 17,310 (1977) (statement of Rep. McClory). Representative McClory voted
for the Moss-Brown Amendment that strengthened FERC vis-à-vis the DOE. See id. at 17,307,
17,310.
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The Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the idea of a statutory sep-
aration of powers. It argues that, steeped as Congress is in the tradition of con-
stitutional separation of powers, it is only natural that it should at times replicate
those design principles in its legislative delegations. This Part first explains how
separating statutory powers both checks executive authority and responds to
concerns about administrative accountability. It then offers a new typology of
statutory separation and checks and balances to explain the phenomenon and
define its limits. This typology demonstrates the diversity of options available to
Congress in crafting horizontal relationships between federal agencies.
Part II presents the case study. It describes the DOE Act’s passage and its
separation of powers between DOE and FERC. It first presents the division of
horizontal authority in historical context. Next, it describes Congress’s allocation
of authority between the two agencies and the statutory entanglements between
them. Finally, it details these entanglements using the typology created in Part I.
Part III turns to the overlooked temporal dimension of agency relationships.
The statutory separation of powers has its origin in Congress’s design decisions,
but like its constitutional counterpart, it evolves over time. Although separating
and balancing statutory powers can be a useful strategy for avoiding concentra-
tions of authority within the administrative state, it is a delicate business. This
Part considers broader lessons from the evolution of the DOE Act’s statutory
scheme for the statutory separation of powers. It focuses on three areas in par-
ticular: the initial allocation of powers, the risk of executive-agency aggrandize-
ment, and the need to adjust power allocations over time. It argues that certain
types of separation and balance, notably those that divide authority between an
independent agency and an executive department, are particularly unstable.
These instabilities and the risk that executive agencies will read statutory author-
izations expansively are particularly evident in energy regulation today. DOE is
flexing its statutory muscle, having put a proposal before FERC to compensate
coal-fired power more generously in wholesale energy markets, and pondering
more aggressive emergency action in the wake of that proposal’s failure. These
efforts are a reminder that statutory checks can also be tools of aggrandizement.
Ironically, after lying virtually dormant for many years, the entanglements Con-
gress created between DOE and FERC now threaten to undo the careful balance
it constructed.
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i . statutory separation of powers
“Separation of powers” as an ethos has assumed a prominent, if unstable,
identity in American legal discourse. The idea has deep historical roots.25 It is
also the core design principle of our constitutional system of government.26 By
dividing power between the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary, the
Founders sought to prevent any one branch from amassing sufficient authority
to govern without constraint.27
Commentators have increasingly applied separation-of-powers logic to sub-
constitutional government arrangements.28 Indeed, given what Jeremy Waldron
has called separation of powers’s status as “an important principle of our political
theory,”29 it would be surprising if the idea’s impact were not felt in subconsti-
tutional domains. This Part extends the logic of separation of powers and its
corollary, checks and balances, to statutory design. Legislation can be a vehicle
25. See BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS bk. XI, ch. IV (Anne M. Cohler ed. &
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748) (articulating a theory of functional separation of
powers in government so that power may check power). Montesquieu’s theory was based on
observations about the English constitution and was a rejection of Thomas Hobbes’s prefer-
ence for consolidation of power in the executive. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (A.P. Mar-
tinich ed., Broadview Press 2002) (1651); see also JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE: AN
ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT, AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 144 (Ian
Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1689) (“[T]hus the Legislative and the Executive Power
come often to be separated.”).
26. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 245-46 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press
2009) (describing “[n]o political truth” as “certainly of greater intrinsic value, or . . . stamped
with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty” than “the political maxim, that the
legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to be separate and distinct”). Jeremy
Waldron opines that the separation of powers was “accepted among the founding generation
as an established touchstone of constitutional legitimacy.” Jeremy Waldron, Separation of Pow-
ers in Thought and Practice?, 54 B.C. L. REV. 433, 437 (2013).
27. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 26, at 245 (James Madison) (“The accumulation of all
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced
the very definition of tyranny.”); see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted . . . not to
avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the gov-
ernmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.”).
28. See, e.g., Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515,
520 (2015) (referring to a “subconstitutional separation of powers” that keeps administrative
agencies in check); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58
STAN. L. REV. 989 (2006) (advocating a formalist approach to the separation of powers in the
criminal state).
29. Waldron, supra note 26, at 435 (emphasis removed).
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for the expression of norms,30 and these norms are often of constitutional
origin.31 I argue here that Congress has internalized a particular set of constitu-
tional norms (separation of powers and checks and balances) and replicated
them at a statutory level.32 This internalization may be seen in Representative
McClory’s reminder to his colleagues during debates on the DOE Act that “[o]ur
way of government includes checks and balances and safeguards.”33
This Part first explains why Congress seeks to replicate the constitutional
separation of powers at the statutory level. It then offers a typology of separa-
tions and checks in order to define the statutory separation of powers and to
demonstrate the rich variety of schemes that fall within its ambit.
A. Why Separate and Balance Statutory Powers?
The literature on agency design demonstrates that Congress shapes the
structure and procedures of administrative agencies for various ends.34 While
commentators have not used the precise terminology of separated and balanced
delegations, they have suggested that creating competition between bureaucratic
agents makes it more likely that these agents will effectuate congressional pur-
poses.35 They have also suggested that plural delegations can leverage broader
30. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 338, 397-98 (1997).
31. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative Policymaking,
118 YALE L.J. 64, 66 (2008) (listing several such norms, including “respect for the rights of
regulated parties, protection of the interests of states and Native American tribes, avoidance
of government bias, and separation of powers”).
32. We see similar moves in the context of federalism. Congress is influenced by constitutional
federalism in its creation of cooperative statutory regimes between the states and the federal
government. See Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federal-
ism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663 (2001) (recognizing the constitutional influence on Congress’s de-
sign choices).
33. 123 CONG. REC. 17,310 (1977) (statement of Rep. McClory).
34. Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987).
35. See O’Connell, supra note 8, at 1677, 1705.
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agency expertise,36 hedge against failure or capture,37 and facilitate congressional
monitoring of agency behavior;38 Congress might also favor overlapping dele-
gations because conflict stimulates creativity, because agencies learn from one
another, or because they can correct one another’s mistakes.39
This Section suggests two additional motives for the division of responsibil-
ity over particular subject matters between federal agencies and for the creation
of checks between them. The first, building on the political-science literature,
characterizes agency design as a tool of political control. It suggests that Con-
gress sometimes divides delegations between independent and executive agen-
cies, as opposed to delegating all authority in a given area to the latter, to mitigate
presidential power. But Congress might also seek fragmentation of policy au-
thority to prevent the dominance of a single perspective within the bureaucracy
(regardless of how this affects the constitutional balance of powers). In all like-
lihood, some combination of these motivations inspires Congress in any given
instance. This Section will discuss each in more detail.
Both motivations for separating powers at the statutory level harken back to
the concerns about faction40 and tyranny that animated constitutional separation
36. See Gersen, supra note 8, at 212-13 (suggesting that competition between agencies in a given
jurisdictional space might incentivize them to invest in expertise to avoid being deprived of
their jurisdiction at a later date); see also Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1142 (suggesting
that combinations of agency expertise may produce better policy and that public-interested
policymakers may actively seek this outcome); Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisi-
tion and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1462-64 (2011) (arguing that institutional
redundancy or overlap may better aggregate information dispersed across agencies, provide
insurance against error, and contribute complementary inputs to the final outcome).
37. On the utility of overlapping delegations in hedging against failure, see Freeman & Rossi,
supra note 8, at 1138. On their role in preventing capture, see O’Connell, supra note 8, at 1677.
38. See O’Connell, supra note 8, at 1694 (citing Mathew McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Con-
gressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984)).
39. See Farber & O’Connell, supra note 8, at 1423-29 (describing the benefits of conflict between
agencies in symmetrical relationships, where neither agency can veto the other’s actions).
Of course, overlapping delegations may sometimes be the result of compromise or acci-
dent. Turf wars between congressional committees can result in legislative compromises that
distribute authority among agencies subject to the various committees’ jurisdiction. See DAVID
C. KING, TURF WARS: HOW CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES CLAIM JURISDICTION 11-32 (1997).
And Jason Marisam argues that duplicative delegations can be the unintentional result of con-
gressional reliance on ambiguous language and savings clauses. Marisam, supra note 8, at 191-
93. But the text and legislative history of the DOE Act described in the next Part confirm that
congressional divisions of delegated authority can be intentional design choices. See infra Part
II.
40. In The Federalist Papers, Madison defined “faction” as “a number of citizens, whether amount-
ing to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent
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of powers at the nation’s founding.41 President Washington enumerated two of
the most pointed dangers in his farewell address. First, he cautioned that “[t]he
alternate domination of one faction over another . . . is itself a frightful despot-
ism.”42 Although he did not elaborate, we can fill in the gaps. The reversal and
re-reversal of policies on an electoral schedule is both jarring and expensive. Sec-
ond, Washington warned, partisanship can lead “at length to a more formal and
permanent despotism. . . . [S]ooner or later the chief of some prevailing faction,
more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this disposition to the
purposes of his own elevation, on the ruins of public liberty.”43
The constitutional separation of powers served to mitigate the risks Wash-
ington described. Yet Congress may still be legitimately concerned with consol-
idated power when it delegates to agencies. Administrative agencies are respon-
sible for both rulemaking and law execution, giving them significant power in
their individual domains.44 And especially on a day-to-day basis, the sphere of
administrative discretion is vast.45 Concentrating discretion within a substantive
domain such as health policy, immigration policy, or environmental policy in the
hands of a single agency thus has its risks. This is especially true when authority
is vested in agencies headed by a single director or administrator. Such agencies,
and aggregate interests of the community.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 26, at 48
(James Madison). I have that definition in mind here.
41. Of course, the goals of the constitutional separation of powers are generally acknowledged to
be broader than these two and include accountability and effectiveness in addition to preven-
tion of tyranny. See, e.g., JESSICA KORN, THE POWER OF SEPARATION: AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONALISM AND THE MYTH OF THE LEGISLATIVE VETO 14-26 (1996) (singling out effective gov-
ernance and prevention of tyranny as important values); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most
Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1729-30 (1996) (pointing to balance, accountability to
the electorate, and energetic, efficient government); Aziz Z. Huq & Jon D. Michaels, The Cycles
of Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 126 YALE L.J. 346, 351 (2016) (emphasizing the pluralism
of values motivating constitutional structure).
42. George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 19, 1796), https://www.ourdocuments.gov
/doc.php?doc=15&page=transcript [https://perma.cc/DC4W-7BSN] (referring to the dan-
gers of the party system).
43. Id. Though these comments postdate the drafting of the Constitution, they encapsulate the
Framers’ fears.
44. For a discussion of the relationship between subject-matter restrictions and forms of authority
in the administrative state, see Todd D. Rakoff, The Shape of the Law in the American Adminis-
trative State, 11 TEL AVIV U. STUD. L. 9, 22 (1992).
45. On the scope of discretion, see, for example., Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The
Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487, 1487 (1983), which observes a pattern of “procedural catch-up”
in which agencies shift their discretion into new areas as courts and Congress develop new
oversight tools; and William H. Simon, The Organizational Premises of Administrative Law, 78
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61 (2015), which argues that canonical administrative law tolerates
broad pockets of administrative discretion.
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with their strong hierarchical structures, place ultimate policy-making responsi-
bility in a solitary individual.46 More worrisome, the heads of these agencies are
typically subject to removal at the discretion of the President. Assigning them
broad authority thus has implications for both administrative and constitutional
separations of power.
1. Statutory Separation of Powers as a Limit on Presidential Authority
Especially where Congress divides authority between executive and inde-
pendent agencies, the independent agency can act as a counterweight to presi-
dential influence. Scholars generally agree that we live in an age of executive-
branch ascendancy.47 Although the Framers were concerned primarily with the
risk of legislative dominance,48 today the most significant threat of tyranny
comes from the presidency.49 Electoral accountability is insufficient to mitigate
this threat, in part because presidential elections are a blunt tool for assessing
voter preference.50 Consider energy policy. President Trump favors fossil-fuel
46. In certain areas of financial policy, for example, the Director of the Consumer Financial Pro-
tection Bureau “alone decides what rules to issue; how to enforce, when to enforce, and
against whom to enforce the law; and what sanctions and penalties to impose on violators of
the law.” PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2016), rev’d, 881
F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc). Some internal checks on administrators have been de-
scribed in the administrative separation-of-powers literature. See infra notes 54-57 and accom-
panying text. But there is no question that single heads of agencies exercise significant au-
thority over the direction of policy-making at their agency and proportionately more authority
than do members of multimember commissions. The description holds true for the heads of
executive agencies as well, albeit mitigated somewhat by the availability of more direct presi-
dential oversight.
47. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J.
523, 533 (1992) (identifying a shift from congressional to presidential lawmaking); Flaherty,
supra note 41, at 1727-30 (opining that “[n]ever has the executive branch been more powerful,
nor more dominant over its two counterparts” and accusing the judiciary of complicity in
expanding executive power); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential
Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 123-24 (1994) (identifying delegations of congressional
authority to the executive branch as a key source of expanded presidential power).
48. See, e.g., James T. Barry III, The Council of Revision and the Limits of Judicial Power, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 235, 249 & n.64 (1989) (noting the Framers’ “fear of overly powerful legislatures”).
The presidential veto and division of the legislature into two houses were designed to answer
the risk of a dominant legislature.
49. See, e.g., Josh Blackman, Presidential Maladministration, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 397 passim (2018);
Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from
Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2320-22 (2006).
50. See Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1385,
1393-94 (2008) (noting that because voters must make electoral decisions based on a bundle
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extraction, while a majority of Americans prefer the development of renewable
energy sources.51 This result is unsurprising when one considers that voters in
the 2016 election largely failed to identify either energy or environmental policy
as the issue they cared most about.52
The rise of presidential authority is due, in part, to the growth of the admin-
istrative state, a significant fraction of which falls under the President’s direct or
indirect control.53 One response to growing executive power is for the branch to
check itself from within. Neal Katyal, for example, recommends the adoption of
robust civil-service protections so that government bureaucrats can act as a
counterweight to political appointees without fear of reprisal.54 Gillian Metzger
has also concluded that internal executive checks can mitigate presidential
of policies, the executive they elect is unlikely to act in ways that align with all of their prefer-
ences); see also Flaherty, supra note 41, at 1825 (questioning the linkage between presidential
elections and the public will). Flaws in our electoral process further contribute to the discon-
nect between voter preference and presidential platforms. See THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RE-
SEARCH SERV., RL32611, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE: HOW IT WORKS IN CONTEMPORARY PRES-
IDENTIAL ELECTIONS 8 (2017).
51. See Brian Kennedy, Two Thirds of Americans Give Priority to Developing Alternative Energy over
Fossil Fuels, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01
/23/two-thirds-of-americans-give-priority-to-developing-alternative-energy-over-fossil
-fuels [https://perma.cc/YD5L-H98U] (reporting on a poll that found that sixty-five percent
of respondents favored the development of alternative energy sources like wind, solar, and
geothermal over the development of fossil fuel sources like coal, oil, and gas, while only
twenty-seven percent would prioritize the latter).
52. Jon Huang et al., Election 2016: Exit Polls, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www
.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/11/08/us/politics/election-exit-polls.html [https://perma.cc
/A8KL-ZP95] (reporting that voters identified the economy, terrorism, immigration, and for-
eign policy as their most important issues).
53. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 1, at 2246-48 (discussing presidential control of the bureaucracy as
an instrument of power); Katyal, supra note 49, at 2317 (arguing that the executive branch has
grown more powerful than the Framers intended, thereby disrupting the balance between the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government thought essential to preventing
tyranny); Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Sep-
aration of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 428-29 (2009) (discussing “the view that the greatest
threat of aggrandized power today lies in the broad delegations of power to the Executive
Branch that characterize the modern administrative and national security state”). Some com-
mentators have found cries of executive-branch dominance unduly alarmist. Eric Posner and
Adrian Vermeule argue that even given capacious legislative delegations to agencies and ex-
pansive executive emergency authority, politics still acts as a sufficient check on the President
and, by extension, on the bureaucracy. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE
UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 12-14 (2010).
54. Katyal, supra note 49, at 2331-34.
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power.55 Metzger identifies a variety of internal executive-branch constraints, in-
cluding the separation of function within agencies, career protections for civil
servants, the organization of employees into distinct organizational units, the
presence of internal agency watchdogs, and the procedural constraints of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.56
The idea of a statutory separation of powers complements Metzger’s and
Katyal’s accounts by making explicit Congress’s role in creating intraexecutive
checks.57 Congress’s position as one branch of government in a system of sepa-
rated powers creates distinct incentives to preserve and potentially enlarge its
own influence vis-à-vis the President.58 This frequently means delegating to an
independent as opposed to an executive agency.59 But Congress’s design discre-
tion, while substantial, is not unlimited. The President’s veto authority operates
as a forceful check on delegation decisions, including on efforts to separate au-
thority by delegating to independent agencies. President Ford, for example, was
able to prevent Congress from creating an independent agency to represent con-
sumers during his tenure.60 Because legislation to create the agency had passed
the House with a very small margin (208-199), its backers elected not to send it
to President Ford for an all-but-certain veto.61
Where Congress cannot secure enough votes to override a veto, or when its
political capital is at a low ebb, we can expect a compromise between presidential
and congressional preference. Thus, where the President proposes the creation
55. Metzger, supra note 53, at 424-25.
56. Id. at 429-31.
57. Where Metzger takes checks as a given, for example, this account explores their origins in
congressional delegations. Katyal, by contrast, devotes more space to agency design. But his
focus is on allocating administrative authority in a way that will produce the best information
to support presidential decisions, not on checking the President. Katyal, supra note 49, at 2325-
27.
58. As David Lewis has recognized, administrative design “is fundamentally the product of inter-
and intra-branch negotiations among political actors with individual interests shaped both by
the institutional incentives of their branches and by their policy preferences.” DAVID E. LEWIS,
PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN: POLITICAL INSULATION IN THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY, 1946-1997, at 22 (2003).
59. Id. at 19 (citing evidence that agencies created by executive action are much less likely to be
insulated from political control than those created through legislation).
60. See id. at 86-87. President Ford offered, as a counterproposal, to enhance the consumer pro-
tection responsibilities of existing executive departments and agencies. See Consumer Agency
Bill, CQ ALMANAC (1976), https://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal76
-1186811 [https://perma.cc/U7X2-XHE2].
61. See Consumer Agency Bill, supra note 60. Lewis describes the President’s authority over con-
gressional delegations as deriving from his veto authority, from his chief-executive position,
and from the advantages of his status as a unitary actor. LEWIS, supra note 58, at 19.
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of a new, powerful executive department (as President Carter did in the 1970s
with DOE), Congress might assert itself through the creation of a companion
independent commission (as it did in creating FERC). Party affiliation may have
little to do with these dynamics. At the time of the DOE Act’s passage, President
Carter occupied the Oval Office, and Democratic majorities governed both
chambers of Congress (with a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate).62 Yet in
the wake of Watergate and a recession in the early part of the decade, “[c]on-
gressmen felt no need to vote with the White House on legislative matters solely
for reasons of Party loyalty.”63
Of course, arrangements that have the potential to limit presidential power
under some conditions have the potential to expand or enhance it under others.64
Where agencies work together, either in a version of Bijal Shah’s statutory coor-
dination,65 Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi’s agency-led collaboration,66 or Daphna
Renan’s presidential “pooling,”67 they can support as well as stymie presidential
initiatives. Part III discusses conditions under which the President might manip-
ulate the statutory checks between agencies to further her own agenda. But as
the case study in Part II demonstrates, where opinion is divided within the bu-
reaucracy about the best way to proceed, and especially where a strong inde-
pendent agency is available to check executive policy, separated powers are likely
to mitigate rather than magnify presidential power in a given policy domain.
62. See Richard L. Madden, Carter’s Relationship with Congress May Depend on a Series of Leadership
Battles Before He Takes Office, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 1976), https://www.nytimes.com/1976/11
/13/archives/carters-relationship-with-congress-may-depend-on-a-series-of.html [https://
perma.cc/HE6T-9X4Y].
63. G.D. Loescher, Carter’s Human Rights Policy and the 95th Congress, 35 WORLD TODAY 149, 151
(1979); see also Eric L. Davis, Legislative Reform and the Decline of Presidential Influence on Cap-
itol Hill, 9 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 465, 465 (1979) (noting that the 95th Congress did not take pos-
itive action on many of President Carter’s legislative proposals despite a nearly two-to-one
majority in both houses). The Democrats in Congress were also still experiencing declining
party loyalty from Southern Democrats. See Alan I. Abramowitz, Is the Revolt Fading? A Note
on Party Loyalty Among Southern Democratic Congressmen, 42 J. POL. 568 (1980) (finding very
little improvement in party unity between Southern and Northern Democrats in the late
1970s).
64. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 603, 637 (2001) (observing that government power is not “a zero-sum product” and that
“[a]rrangements could weaken, or strengthen, different branches at the same time”).
65. Shah, supra note 9.
66. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1161-65 (describing agencies’ voluntary use of memoranda
of understanding to coordinate action).
67. Renan, supra note 11, at 218-40.
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2. The Administrative Virtues of Fragmentation
Congress need not have the constitutional separation of powers squarely in
mind when it divides power between agencies and sets up checks and balances
between them. A second justification for the statutory separation of powers is
purely internal to the administrative state. By ensuring that no administrative
actor can shape policy unilaterally, fragmenting authority within the executive
branch can minimize the potential for tyranny by any one faction or interest
within the administrative state. Jon Michaels expands on this idea in his argu-
ment for an “administrative separation of powers” between agency political lead-
ership, civil servants, and civil society.68 Fracture and messiness, by this account,
are beneficial features of the bureaucracy rather than problems to be remedied.69
As Michaels puts it, the division of responsibility for administrative policy “rec-
oncile[s] Madison with modernity.”70
The idea of a statutory separation of powers complements the administra-
tive-separation-of-powers literature in three ways. First, it highlights Congress’s
role in creating and maintaining administrative separation and balance. In this
way, it knits together theories of congressional delegation and agency design
with the idea of administrative separation of powers. Second, it enlarges the dis-
cussion to focus not just on relationships within agencies, but also among them.71
Although the idea of interagency checking has been mentioned by some com-
mentators,72 it deserves separate treatment. Finally, the existing literature takes
a static approach to the division of administrative authorities. But the success or
failure of schemes to separate and balance power between agencies can only be
evaluated over time. By introducing a temporal dimension into the analysis, Part
68. JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO THE AMERICAN RE-
PUBLIC 144 (2017).
69. See id. at 10.
70. Id. at 17 (elaborating that separation within the administrative bureaucracy “anchor[s] . . . ad-
ministrative agencies firmly within the constitutional tradition of employing rivalrous insti-
tutional counterweights to promote good governance, political accountability, and compli-
ance with the rule of law”).
71. The primary focus of the administrative-separation-of-powers literature has been on the re-
lationship between political appointees, civil servants, and civil society. See id. at 16 (arguing
that administrative power is “triangulat[ed]” between these actors).
72. See Farber & O’Connell, supra note 8, at 1422-23 (identifying various power dynamics between
agencies as well as flagging ways that internal checks and balances—and their safeguards—
guard against abuse of power, as one benefit of such arrangements); Katyal, supra note 49, at
2324-28 (discussing the idea of agency redundancy primarily as a way of ensuring varied ad-
vice to the President).
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III warns that initial divisions designed to preserve a role for independent agen-
cies in a given policy arena can, if not carefully crafted, evolve to favor greater
executive control.
B. The Shape of the Doctrine
This Section elaborates the forms that the statutory separation of powers can
take. Because the separation of powers, as an ethos, does not prescribe particular
arrangements but merely suggests the application of general principles, the stat-
utory separation of powers takes many forms. It need not adhere strictly to the
Founders’ brand of divided authority.73 It may be complete or partial. It may be
balanced or unbalanced. At a minimum, however, a statutory separation of pow-
ers will seek to divide authority among administrative actors so that no one actor
can fully control the direction of substantive policy within a discrete subject-
matter area. In keeping with its constitutional counterpart, moreover, the statu-
tory separation of powers is likely to include mechanisms that allow agencies to
check one another.74 These checks play a key role in maintaining divisions of
authority, as they allow agencies to resist aggrandizement and encroachment by
their counterparts.
1. Separation
The most visible manifestation of statutory separation of powers is the divi-
sion of statutory responsibilities between two or more agencies. Existing typol-
ogies of redundant and overlapping delegation stress two features: whether stat-
utory authorities are divided along functional lines75 and the degree of overlap
between agencies. An additional attribute, particularly vital in statutory separa-
tion-of-powers schemes, is the relative independence of each agency from the
73. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence Is So Abysmal, 57 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 506, 511 (1989) (arguing that even the courts should not slavishly adhere to
the Framers’ specific intentions with respect to separation of powers and should instead be
guided by their spirit).
74. Statutory separation of powers therefore involves a special arrangement of overlapping agency
delegations. Not all redundancies constitute such an arrangement, although redundancy may
feature in a statutory separation-of-powers scheme.
75. Elizabeth Magill cautions against separation-of-powers formalism. See Magill, supra note 64
and accompanying text. Mindful of Magill’s critique, this Section presents schemes that track
notions about the “core” role of particular administrative actors as but one exemplar of a larger
set of arrangements, all of which might satisfy the basic conditions of a statutory separation
of powers.
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White House. Examples elucidating each of these categories are discussed briefly
below.
First, as with the constitutional separation of powers, many congressional
delegations separate authorities between agencies along functional lines; for ex-
ample, by dividing adjudicative, prosecutorial, and rulemaking authority. The
adjudicative agency is often given some degree of independence, while the
agency charged with legislative and executive authority remains subject to
greater presidential oversight. Pairs of agencies whose authorities were divided
along functional lines include the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Com-
mission (adjudication) and the Mining Safety and Health Administration (rule-
making and civil prosecution)76; the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission (adjudication) and the Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (rulemaking and civil prosecution);77 and the Energy Research and De-
velopment Administration (research and promotion of nuclear technology) and
the independent Nuclear Regulatory Commission (permitting and safety regu-
lation).78 This last division resulted from fears that the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion’s dual mission of nuclear-power promotion and safety regulation created a
conflict of interest.79
Sometimes Congress divides authority within functional domains.80 Indeed,
Jacob Gersen suggests that “statutes that parcel out authority or jurisdiction to
76. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (2018).
77. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2018). Both Mining Safety and Health Administration and Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration refer cases of potential criminal violation to the De-
partment of Justice for prosecution. See Daniel J. Gifford, Adjudication in Independent Tribu-
nals: The Role of an Alternative Agency Structure, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 965, 967 (1991)
(noting that several agencies rely on the federal courts for adjudication of claims brought by
the agency). Even if an agency combines all three functions, there are internal-siloing require-
ments.
The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, whose requirements apply to agencies unless
Congress expressly supplants them by separate statute, obligates agencies to maintain separa-
tion between officials who investigate or prosecute a case and those who preside over its ad-
judication. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2018).
78. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (2018).
79. Id. § 5801(c) (finding that the separation was in the public interest).
80. In such cases, the precise tasks assigned to each agency may not be identical, but each is
properly characterized as, for instance, “rulemaking” as opposed to “prosecutorial” or “adju-
dicatory” authority. When it comes to rulemaking, for example, the authority to propose rules
might be separated from the authority to dispose of them; the DOE Act allocates some policy-
making proposal authority to the DOE while vesting disposal authority with FERC. Pub. L.
No. 95-91, § 403, 91 Stat. 565, 585 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7173 (2018)).
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multiple agencies may be the norm, rather than an exception.”81 Examples in-
clude EPA and the Department of Transportation’s effective joint authority over
motor-vehicle efficiency,82 EPA and FERC’s shared responsibility for hydroelec-
tric permitting,83 and the relationship described in greater detail in the next Part
between FERC and DOE.84 Similarly, section 216 of the Federal Power Act di-
vides responsibility for federal siting of interstate electric transmission lines be-
tween FERC and DOE, requiring that DOE first designate suitable corridors but
then granting FERC sole authority to issue permits for the lines.85
Second, the degree of overlap between agency authorities varies. Freeman
and Rossi observe that delegations might involve genuinely overlapping author-
ity, related jurisdictional assignments, interacting jurisdictional assignments, or
merely delegations requiring concurrence.86 Federal antitrust enforcement, for
example, is split between the independent Federal Trade Commission and the
Department of Justice.87 These agencies have substantially overlapping author-
ity and therefore must coordinate to divide up particular responsibilities.88 By
contrast, Congress carefully divided the tasks of siting interstate transmission
lines between FERC and DOE with no overlap between them. Instead, DOE’s
identification of National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors is a prerequi-
site for FERC to permit new lines.89
81. Gersen, supra note 8, at 208.
82. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1169-73.
83. See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2217, 2254,
2260, 2262-63 (2005) (explaining the roles of public-resource agencies and FERC and detail-
ing their interactions).
84. See infra Part II.
85. 16 U.S.C. § 824p (2018). State authorities retain primary authority to site lines, but FERC
may do so if certain enumerated conditions are met. Id.
86. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1145. Freeman and Rossi offer a detailed analysis of agencies’
potential coordination tools and their implications for presidential and judicial oversight of
agencies. Id. This Article builds on their account by elaborating on Congress’s role in both
creating and managing agency authorities.
87. See William E. Kovacic, Downsizing Antitrust: Is It Time to End Dual Federal Enforcement?, 41
ANTITRUST BULL. 505, 508 (1996).
88. See, e.g., Premerger Notification and the Merger Review Process, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Apr.
9, 2019, 6:56 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust
-laws/mergers/premerger-notification-merger-review [https://perma.cc/XXG7-6QJ6] (de-
scribing the interagency “clearance process” by which the two agencies decide which will re-
view a given merger filing).
89. FERC is only authorized to grant siting applications if states have withheld their approval for
more than a year or have conditioned approval in a way that will prevent the line from reduc-
ing transmission congestion or that makes the line economically infeasible. 16 U.S.C.
§ 824p(b)(1)(C) (2018).
the yale law journal 129:378 2019
398
Finally, in the statutory separation of powers, agencies’ relative position
within the bureaucracy matters. Congress might separate powers between two
or more executive departments, between two or more independent commis-
sions, or between executive agencies and independent commissions.90 Although
each could have fragmentation advantages, the last arrangement—like the one
that separated energy authorities between DOE and FERC—can harness the ef-
ficiency and coordination advantages of executive action while providing some
checks on presidential authority.91
Congress also divided authority between an executive and an independent
agency when it created the Federal Trade Commission in 1914 as a counterpart
to the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division.92 The conventional account of
the Federal Reserve’s creation similarly emphasizes its statutory separation from
the executive,93 a circumstance that has led to friction over the years with the
90. The description of agencies as either “executive” or “independent” is oversimplified, but the
categories have sufficient meaning to be useful for purposes of this discussion. For a more
nuanced description of agency independence, see infra Section III.C.2.
91. Of course, independent agencies are only relatively independent from the President in that the
President still nominates the men and women who head them. While these nominees require
Senate consent, the ability to select a nominee who is more or less inclined to share presiden-
tial priorities carries significant power to shape an agency’s agenda. See infra Section III.C.2
for a discussion of how recent nominations have affected FERC’s ability to act as a counter-
weight to the DOE.
92. Richard Posner notes that proponents of administrative process might have supported the
creation of the Federal Trade Commission in 1914 because of its institutional advantages and,
in particular, its commissioners’ freedom from “heavy-handed political interference by the
White House.” Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission: A Retrospective, 72 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 761, 767 (2005). Posner himself is skeptical of “the theoretical case for the superi-
ority of the administrative process over the judicial and the legislative.” Id. While the Depart-
ment of Justice’s Antitrust Division was not formally established until 1919, the legislative
history of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 refers to the advantages of removing
antitrust authority, at least in part, from White House control. See 51 CONG. REC. 8,842 (1914)
(statement of Rep. Covington) (explaining why “the bill remove[d] entirely from the control
of the President and the Secretary of Commerce the investigations conducted . . . by the com-
mission . . . ”); see also id. at 8,857 (statement of Rep. Morgan) (speaking in favor of the cre-
ation of an independent commission that is “[i]ndependent of the President, independent of
Cabinet Officers, [and] removed so far as possible from partisan politics”).
93. See Peter Conti-Brown, The Institutions of Federal Reserve Independence, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 257,
263-65 (2015) (describing the standard account as focusing on the “statutory separation . . . be-
tween the President and the Fed Chair” but enhancing that account with nonstatutory deter-
minants of Federal Reserve independence).
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Department of the Treasury, the agency from which the Federal Reserve’s pow-
ers were removed.94
Because a constellation of structural, procedural, and political characteristics
affects an agency’s independence,95 the ability of a particular so-called “inde-
pendent” agency to push back on executive policies will vary. Congress appears
to have been particularly careful in insulating FERC from both presidential and
Department of Energy politics.96 In the Senate debate on the DOE Act, Senator
Lee Metcalf (D-Mont.) came out in favor of a truly independent counterweight
to DOE, opining that “independent regulatory agencies . . . provide[] a balance
against undue Executive authority.”97 And Representative Jack Brooks (D-Tex.)
supported assigning some energy functions to an agency whose five members
would “hire their own staff and hearing examiners” and “have a separately iden-
tified allocation in the Department[] [of Energy’s] budget.”98 While complete
insulation is a fiction, FERC’s architects intentionally codified structural features
of independence that would help FERC serve as a counterweight to DOE.
The structural characteristics of separation are an important part of the story
of the statutory separation of powers. But equally important, and less well
known or understood, is the companion story of statutory checks and balances
to which the next Section turns.
2. Checks and Balances
The statutory separation of powers involves not just separation but also
checks and balances, which might be called entanglements, between agencies.
These checks are less well studied in the legal literature than the phenomenon of
94. On the complex relationship between the two agencies, which share authority over many of
the same actors in the banking world, see, for example, Carter H. Golembe, Much More Is
Involved in Agency Turf Wars than Meets the Eye, 14 BANKING POL’Y REP. 2 (1995).
95. On the characteristics of agency independence, see Datla & Revesz, supra note 7, which iden-
tifies structural and functional features that help determine an agency’s relative independence;
David E. Lewis & Jennifer L. Selin, Political Control and the Forms of Agency Independence, 83
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1487, 1504-05 (2015), which concludes that “agency independence should
be thought of as a scale” because “so many [structural] features affect responsiveness”; and
Jennifer L. Selin, What Makes an Agency Independent, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 971 (2015), which
analyzes data on statutory features of independence.
96. 123 CONG. REC. 17,268 (1977) (statement of Rep. Horton) (“What we tried to do in the sub-
committee and full committee was to make [FERC] as completely independent as possible.”).
97. Id. at 15,317 (statement of Sen. Metcalf).
98. Id. at 17,264 (statement of Rep. Brooks).
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divided agency powers.99 This Section therefore provides a more detailed typol-
ogy of statutory mechanisms that allow one agency to control the activities of
another in some form. Not all forms of interagency interaction rise to the level
of statutory checks and balances. Unlike the examples described below, most
statutory consultation and coordination mechanisms would not fall within the
definition of a statutory check.100 Neither would the ability of one agency to in-
tervene in the proceedings of another, nor the opportunity to comment during
another agency’s rulemaking or during OIRA review, nor interagency lobby-
ing.101 To the extent that such measures are voluntary or consist of procedural
permissions only, they exert insufficient force to serve as genuine checks on the
authority of other agencies. Where these requirements do have more muscle,
they are better categorized under one of the headings below.
This typology does not purport to offer a complete list of entanglement
types. However, it captures the most common variants and will hopefully stim-
ulate efforts to identify and explore additional categories.102
a. Veto Gates
The strongest version of the interagency check is the interagency veto. Akin
to the President’s veto,103 the interagency veto allows one agency to prevent ac-
tion by another. As discussed below,104 FERC has the authority to prevent DOE
from taking certain actions if it finds that such actions would “significantly af-
fect” any of FERC’s functions.105 Similarly, the Competition in Contract Act al-
lows agencies to override Government Accountability Office bid-protest stays
99. A notable exception is Farber & O’Connell, supra note 8, at 1416, which paints relationships
between agencies in broad strokes as one of hard hierarchy, soft hierarchy, symmetry, or ad-
visory/monitoring. Other work that describes the relative relationship of agencies within stat-
utory schemes includes Shah, supra note 9, at 1967, which explains that when Congress ex-
pressly creates coordinated schemes involving multiple agencies, it typically assigns one
agency a lead role; DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 83; and Freeman & Rossi.
100. See, e.g., Shah, supra note 9 (describing statutory mechanisms to coordinate agency authori-
ties).
101. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 83, at 2229-31 (proposing that interagency lobbying can
ensure fidelity to secondary statutory mandates).
102. Part II provides some detailed examples of the first three checks discussed below: veto gates,
agenda setting, and emergency override.
103. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
104. See infra Section II.D.2.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 7174(a) (2018).
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for a pending government contract.106 For another example, consider the En-
dangered Species Act (ESA), which contains two versions of the interagency
veto. First, federal agencies may not proceed with actions if the Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS) or National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) determines that
those actions are likely to jeopardize the continued existence of an endangered
or threatened species.107 However, in a second example of interagency veto
power, the Endangered Species Interagency Committee (an agency that Con-
gress created in 1978 composed of the heads of various existing agencies) may
override FWS and NMFS conclusions and allow the underlying action to pro-
ceed.108
b. Agenda Setting
One agency might also exercise control over another by influencing the lat-
ter’s agenda,109 and Congress can design statutory schemes to enable or require
this approach. In the example discussed in Part II, Congress has authorized DOE
to propose rules or standards that FERC must then consider on an expedited
basis.110 Agenda-setting powers like this one permit an executive agency to ef-
fectively commandeer the resources of an independent counterpart.111 That au-
106. 31 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2018). The agency may override stays if it finds that “performance of the
contract is in the best interests of the United States.” Id. § 3553(d)(3)(C).
107. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)-(b) (2018). Similarly, under the Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-
206, 77 Stat. 392 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C), the EPA is given
authority to review and comment on environmental-impact analyses conducted by any other
agency under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). If EPA determines that the agency
action triggering environmental review is unsatisfactory, the matter is referred to the Council
on Environmental Quality. 42 U.S.C. § 7609(b) (2018).
108. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e), (h) (2018). The committee may permit such projects to go forward based
on a supermajority vote if it finds, among other things, that the action is in the public interest
and that its benefits clearly outweigh those of alternative actions. Id. § 1536(h).
109. On the importance of agenda-setting as a tool of power in constitutional domains, see Aziz Z.
Huq, The Constitutional Law of Agenda Control, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1401 (2016), which argues
that agenda control should be understood as a feature of constitutional design. Potential
sources of agency agenda setting include Congress, courts, the President, and outside inter-
ests. See Cary Coglianese & Daniel E. Walters, Agenda-Setting in the Regulatory State: Theory
and Evidence, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 93, 103-11 (2016).
110. Department of Energy Organization Act § 403(a)-(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7173(a)-(b) (2018).
111. Cf. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761-70 (1982) (considering
and rejecting the argument that the congressional requirement that states consider various
utility-pricing reforms violated the Tenth Amendment).
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thority is all the more coercive because agencies operate with limited re-
sources.112 As commentators have noted, agencies’ agendas “can have a major
impact on the agencies’ ultimate regulatory performance.”113 Interagency
agenda setting is thus a potentially potent tool of control.
c. Emergency Overrides
A further form of statutory check is the emergency override. Congress rec-
ognizes that statutory allocations of authority appropriate under business-as-
usual conditions may be insufficient during periods of crisis. At such moments,
concentrated executive authority may be needed to confront exigencies quickly
and decisively. Sometimes, an agency’s authority to override other agencies’ de-
cisions is premised on a presidential declaration of a national emergency.114 In
other cases, Congress locates emergency-declaration authority in agency
heads.115 As discussed below,116 emergency overrides can be a tempting tool of
executive overreach, in part because of the discretion typically afforded the Pres-
ident and executive agencies in declaring and taking steps to confront a national
emergency.117
112. Indeed, Eric Biber has argued that courts are particularly deferential to agency resource-allo-
cation decisions because they recognize this pervasive feature of administrative governance.
See Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV.
1, 16-25 (2008); see also Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of Administrative
Agency Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 461, 467 (2008) (“[C]ourts defer to agency de-
cisions regarding resource allocations.”).
113. Coglianese & Walters, supra note 109, at 94 (summarizing conversations at a workshop on
agency agenda setting).
114. See, e.g., Defense Production Reauthorization Act of 2009 § 301, 50 U.S.C. § 4532(d) (2018)
(permitting waiver of notice to Congress of loans exceeding $50 million for materials deemed
critical to the national defense if the President has declared a national emergency).
115. See, e.g., Federal Power Act § 202(c), 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c) (2018) (granting the Federal Power
Commission the authority to require temporary electricity-grid actions after determining that
an emergency exists).
116. See infra Section II.D.3.
117. See, e.g., Sean Illing, Trump Declared a National Emergency at the Border. I Asked 11 Experts if It’s
Legal., VOX (Feb. 15, 2019, 11:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/2019/2/15/18225359/trump
-speech-national-emergencies-act-border [https://perma.cc/3N3V-42AT] (quoting legal
scholars who explain that the National Emergencies Act, which authorizes the President to
declare an emergency, does not define national emergencies).
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d. Sequential Decision-Making
In other cases, statutes require one agency to act before another can exercise
its own statutory responsibilities. Section 216(a) of the Federal Power Act, for
example, gives DOE authority to designate National Interest Electric Transmis-
sion Corridors: areas where it determines that transmission-line siting would
support economic growth, supply diversification, or serve other interests.118 The
statute also grants FERC authority to issue permits for transmission lines in such
corridors under certain conditions.119 But FERC’s exercise of this authority, and
by extension its ability to speed up the construction of interstate transmission
lines, is necessarily limited by DOE’s designation of corridors.120
e. Interagency Delegation
Agencies might also control counterparts by delegating responsibilities to
them. This practice is better described as agency subdelegation.121 Subdelegation
typically involves the delegation of authority by an agency head to subordinates
within the agency. But subdelegations outside of the agency also occur.122 When
a statute gives one agency the power to delegate responsibilities to another, it
may alter the balance of authority between the two. Subdelegation can some-
times eliminate conflict between agencies by consolidating related authorities in
a single agency actor.123 But subdelegation might also facilitate a special form of
agenda control, especially if the recipient of the delegated authorities is required
to exercise them. Congress may not always speak clearly on this point. For ex-
ample, the DOE Organization Act authorizes the Secretary of Energy to delegate
118. 16 U.S.C. § 824p(a) (2018).
119. Id. § 824p(b).
120. There are currently no such designations. See Report Concerning Designation of National Interest
Electric Transmission Corridors, DEP’T OF ENERGY 4 (Sept. 2015), https://www.energy.gov/sites
/prod/files/2015/09/f26/2015%20Report%20on%20Designation%20of%20National
%20Corridors.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BWM-5J3V]; see also Cal. Wilderness Coal v. U.S.
Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2011) (vacating the only two designations ever
made for failure to conduct adequate consultation with the states).
121. On the practice of subdelegation more generally, including subdelegation to political officials
and career staff within agencies, see Jennifer Nou, Subdelegating Powers, 117 COLUM. L. REV.
473 (2017).
122. See Farber & O’Connell, supra note 8, at 1447-50 (examining subdelegation’s impacts on con-
flict between and within agencies and articulating constitutional limits on the phenomenon).
123. See Bijal Shah, Interagency Transfers of Adjudication Authority, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 279, 311-14
(2017).
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“any of his functions” to officers and employees of the Department.124 Because
FERC is technically “within the Department,” this provision may authorize del-
egations to the Commission. It is not clear whether FERC may refuse to exercise
delegated authority, and there is no evidence that it has done so to date.125
f. Leadership Intermingling
A final form of interagency checking is leadership intermingling, where
agency leadership structures include representatives from other agencies. Com-
mentators have identified the placement of political appointees within the
agency hierarchy as a key tool of presidential control.126 Similarly, placing an ac-
tor from one agency within the decision-making structure of another allows the
former to influence the actions of the latter. Consider, for example, the original
composition of the Federal Power Commission (FPC). The Commission’s mem-
bers were the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Interior, and the Secretary
of Agriculture.127 In this case, FPC lacked independent leadership altogether, and
the Departments of War, Interior, and Agriculture controlled agency policy. Such
cobbling together of new agency leadership was not uncommon in the early
1900s. The Secretary of the Treasury was made a member of the new Recon-
struction Finance Corporation in 1932, for example.128
Sometimes, rather than serving as new agency leadership themselves, cabi-
net secretaries and other agency representatives are tasked with selecting new
agency heads. For example, the Secretaries of Treasury and Agriculture and the
124. Department of Energy Organization Act § 642, 42 U.S.C. § 7252 (2018).
125. DOE Organization Act Section 402(e) provides more direct authority for the Secretary to del-
egate responsibilities to FERC, though in this section it is clearer that such delegations grant
FERC “jurisdiction” over such matters rather than compelling it to address them. Id.
§ 7172(e).
126. See David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age of Agency
Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1096 (2008); Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald F.
Wright, The Future of the Administrative Presidency: Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65
U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 577 (2011).
127. Federal Water Power Act, Pub. L. No. 66-280, § 1, 41 Stat. 1063, 1063 (1920) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (2018)); see also Clyde L. Seavey, Functions of the Federal
Power Commission, 201 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 73, 73 (1939) (describing the Com-
mission’s original leadership structure).
128. Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act, Pub. L. No. 72-2, § 3, 47 Stat. 5, 5 (1932), repealed by
Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1957, 22 Fed. Reg. 4633, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 173 (2018),
and in 71 Stat. 647.
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Comptroller of the Currency served as “The Reserve Bank Organization Com-
mittee” under the Federal Reserve Act of 1913.129 The Secretary of Agriculture
appointed the members of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration pursuant
to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.130 And today, the Secretary of the
Interior appoints two of the National Indian Gaming Commissioners, while the
President appoints the Commission Chair. 131
Ultimately, the statutory separation of powers is more about intention and
effect than it is about a specific set of arrangements. Of course, when examining
particular instances of divided authority, the details matter a great deal (as the
case study below will demonstrate). Nevertheless, the broader theory offers a
useful framework for identifying individual cases and for understanding their
implications.
The next Part offers a single, detailed case study to demonstrate how the
statutory separation of powers works in practice.132 Lessons from the case study
will then be used in Part III to highlight challenges with statutory separation and
balancing and to propose ways in which various institutional actors might ad-
dress them.
i i . separating energy powers
The aims of this Part are both descriptive and positive. First, it provides a
brief background on the history and structure of the federal energy bureaucracy
leading up to the 1970s. Second, it focuses squarely on the bureaucratic shifts
and upheaval in response to the energy crisis of that decade. It examines the pol-
itics of the moment to help explain why a separation and balancing approach to
energy delegation might have appealed to Congress in 1977. It also draws on the
legislative history of the DOE Act to demonstrate that key members of Congress
had separation and balance in mind in drafting the Act. Finally, it details the
129. The Act tasked the Committee with designating Federal Reserve districts. Federal Reserve
Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 2, 38 Stat. 251, 251-53 (1913) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 222-
223 (2018)).
130. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-10, § 10(a), 48 Stat. 31, 37 (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 610 (2018)), invalidated by United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
131. 25 U.S.C. § 2704(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2018).
132. As Huq has observed with respect to the constitutional separation of powers, while “granular
analysis of situated and specific dynamics provides a less breathtakingly synoptic view of legal
and constitutional institutions,” it “may provide better insight about how the separation of
powers works in practice.” Aziz Z. Huq, Separation of Powers Metatheory, 118 COLUM. L.
REV. 1517, 1538–39 (2018) (reviewing JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS'S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLA-
TIVE AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (2017)).
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DOE Act’s allocations of authority between FERC and DOE and sets the stage
for a discussion of their implications in Part III.133
One caveat is necessary. States retain substantial authority to regulate energy
generation, transportation, and use. This design decision, too, is a structural
choice by Congress to divide authority. It is a choice related to statutory separa-
tion of powers, just as the maintenance of states as separate sovereigns in a fed-
eral system is related to constitutional separation of powers.134 But energy fed-
eralism is already the subject of a substantial literature,135 and its exploration as
a corollary to the statutory separation of powers requires separate treatment to
do it justice. Thus, the focus of this Part remains on horizontal allocation of the
federal government’s energy authority among administrative agencies.
A. Background
Before 1920, all regulation of electricity generation, transmission and distri-
bution occurred at the state or local level. In 1920, Congress passed the Federal
Power Act (FPA) to manage the growing number of hydroelectric projects on
federal lands and waterways.136 The Act created the Federal Power Commission,
133. The focus here is primarily on authority over the generation of electric power and the regula-
tion of markets for electricity. The federal energy bureaucracy is charged with regulating eve-
rything from uranium mining to oil pipelines, but it is with respect to electricity—and to some
extent natural gas—that Congress’s delegations of authority best demonstrate the statutory
separation of powers. These authorities also address most squarely the area of greatest con-
troversy in U.S. energy policy today: the choice between fossil-fuel plants and lower-emitting
resources. This Part will therefore concentrate on authorities to regulate electricity.
134. For a discussion of the federalism relationship, see, for example, Bradford R. Clark, Separation
of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001), which argues that the sep-
aration of powers supports federalism; and Bruce G. Peabody & John D. Nugent, Toward a
Unifying Theory of the Separation of Powers, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 21 (2003), which argues that
federalism and separation of powers should be seen as elements of a unified scheme of divided
powers.
135. See, e.g., Daniel A. Lyons, Protecting States in the New World of Energy Federalism, 67 EMORY
L.J. 921 (2018); Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1621 (2015); Hari M.
Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 MD. L. REV. 773 (2013); Jim
Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism, 95 TEX. L. REV. 399 (2016).
136. Hydropower generated more than forty percent of the United States’s electricity in the early
1900s. As late as the 1940s, hydropower was responsible for seventy-five percent of electricity
used in the West and Pacific Northwest. Hydropower Program, U.S. BUREAU RECLAMATION
(Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.usbr.gov/power/edu/history.html [https://perma.cc/7UFZ
-AJ3W].
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which was originally composed of the Secretaries of War, Agriculture, and Inte-
rior.137 This Commission was tasked with licensing and regulating hydroelectric
projects that fell within federal jurisdiction.138 In 1930, FPC became an inde-
pendent five-member commission whose members were appointed by the Pres-
ident with the advice and consent of the Senate.139
Congress amended the FPA in 1935, expanding the Commission’s jurisdic-
tion to interstate transmission of power and to wholesale sales of power in inter-
state commerce. Gradually, other federal-government actors joined FPC in reg-
ulating aspects of the electricity system. When the first nuclear power plants
were contemplated, for example, Congress created the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion to both promote and oversee them.140
Throughout this evolution, the states maintained a vital role in energy gov-
ernance. With the important exceptions of hydropower and nuclear power,
states retained control over the planning, siting, and construction of power
plants. They also set rates for power from those plants that was sold directly to
end users. And yet the federal government wields tools that can affect which
plants companies choose to invest in. The rates for wholesale sales of power de-
termine how profitable those plants will be. As will be discussed later in this Part,
the Federal Power Act and other statutes also provide the federal government
with emergency authority that has been used to support individual plants or sec-
tors.
B. Crisis and Reorganization
The 1970s were a decade of crisis in energy policy. In the wake of the oil-
price shocks early in the decade, energy agencies first multiplied and were then
consolidated. Congress yielded, to some extent, to the rhetoric of exigency that
followed the national furor over spikes in energy prices and concerns about sup-
ply. But it refused to accede to President Carter’s requests to consolidate all fed-
eral energy authority (with the exception of authority over nuclear power) in a
single executive department. The DOE Act instead split control over energy de-
cision-making between the cabinet-level Department of Energy and a new, in-
dependent Federal Energy Regulatory Commission that acted as a successor to
137. Seavey, supra note 127, at 73.
138. Id.
139. 16 U.S.C. § 792 (2018); Seavey, supra note 127, at 73.
140. Alice Buck, The Atomic Energy Commission, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY 1 (1983), https://
www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/AEC%20History.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BZH-LGC8].
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FPC. FERC’s Commissioners were shielded from presidential removal except in
the case of inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.141
That division, however, was incomplete. Congress left behind a series of en-
tanglements between the two agencies. In particular, it left the Secretary of En-
ergy—and thus, by extension, the President—key powers over FERC. Although
these powers have been infrequently used, the current Administration seems in-
creasingly likely to employ them. To understand the balance of power in the fed-
eral energy bureaucracy, therefore, we must understand not only the separation
of powers between DOE and FERC, but also the ways in which the agencies
might act as checks and balances on one another. The remainder of this Part ex-
plains the history and politics of the 1970s energy reorganization and its basic
allocations of power. Part III will evaluate some of the consequences of these
design decisions in greater detail.
Crisis provided the impetus for reorganization of the federal energy bureau-
cracy. By the early 1970s, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), whose founding members were Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Venezuela, and
Saudi Arabia, controlled over eighty percent of the world’s oil exports.142 In 1973,
the “October War” between Israel and its Arab neighbors led OPEC to cut supply
and raise prices.143 Saudi Arabia went further, banning all exports to the United
States in retaliation for a military aid package to Israel.144 The other Arab oil
states soon followed Saudi Arabia’s lead.145 Gasoline prices in the United States
rose by forty percent and long lines formed at gas stations.146
The embargo ended in March 1974 as the conflict drew to a close, but not
before instilling in the United States a deep sense of energy insecurity.147 The
embargo had caught the United States totally off guard.148 It had also, as Daniel
Yergin put it, “struck at [Americans’] fundamental beliefs in the endless abun-
dance of resources.”149 One response to the crisis was thus to pursue “energy
141. 42 U.S.C. § 7171(b)(1) (2018).
142. ROBERT MCNALLY, CRUDE VOLATILITY: THE HISTORY AND THE FUTURE OF BOOM-BUST OIL
PRICES 120 (2017).
143. YERGIN, supra note 13, at 607-08.
144. See MCNALLY, supra note 142, at 130-31; YERGIN, supra note 13, at 606-08.
145. YERGIN, supra note 13, at 606-08.
146. Id. at 616-17.
147. MCNALLY, supra note 142, at 132. McNally writes that it “is difficult to overstate the depth of
the gloom that descended on western officials and business people in the 1970s at the prospect
of massive future dependence on Middle Eastern oil imports.” Id.
148. YERGIN, supra note 13, at 588, 608.
149. Id. at 598.
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independence.”150 President Nixon imposed price restrictions designed to stim-
ulate domestic production,151 and in 1975 Congress established the Strategic Pe-
troleum Reserve and banned oil exports.152
Another response was an executive (and, to some extent, a legislative) desire
to restructure the federal energy bureaucracy in order to better situate the Presi-
dent, in particular, to prevent or respond to future crises. The Nixon, Ford, and
Carter Administrations all pursued some form of consolidated control over en-
ergy policy.153 At the same time, Congress sought to keep at least some energy
policy-making in agencies with a degree of independence from the White House.
Federal energy agencies began to proliferate. In 1973, President Nixon cre-
ated a Federal Energy Office within the Executive Office of the President “to
carry out all energy-related functions” of that office.154 One year later, in 1974,
Congress transferred the Federal Energy Office’s responsibilities for oil alloca-
tion and pricing regulations to a new independent agency, the Federal Energy
Administration.155 It also created several new agencies in the Energy Reorgani-
zation Act of 1974.156 The Energy Research and Development Administration
(ERDA) was tasked with coordinating federal energy research and development
150. MCNALLY, supra note 142, at 133 (referring to President Nixon’s November 7, 1973 address
calling for energy self-sufficiency by 1980).
151. Id. at 133-34.
152. Id. at 136. This was accomplished by way of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975,
which also established fuel-economy standards for motor vehicles and conservation standards
for appliances. Id.
153. See Charles O. Jones & Randall Strahan, The Effect of Energy Politics on Congressional and Exec-
utive Organization in the 1970s, 10 LEG. STUD. Q. 151, 153 (1985). Jones and Strahan applaud the
instinct to consolidate, arguing that “the principles of hierarchy suggest that a President
should take command of a highly disparate apparatus when it is challenged by a major event
like the Arab oil embargo.” Id. For similar reasons, the authors are critical of congressional
resistance to this centralizing tendency, likening Congress’s response to the crisis to “the Ok-
lahoma land rush” as new committees and subcommittees sought energy-policy jurisdiction.
Id.
154. Richard Nixon, Remarks Announcing Establishment of the Federal Energy Office (Dec. 4,
1973), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=4060 [https://perma.cc/FG8D
-QSSR]. In addition to allocating scarce supplies of oil and related products and gathering
data on existing supplies and consumption patterns, this office, which consisted of more than
two thousand employees, was also tasked with creating a plan to increase domestic-energy
supplies. Roger Anders, The Federal Energy Administration, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY 1-2 (Nov.
1980), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/FEA%20History.pdf [https://perma.cc
/5BZ3-KFE7].
155. Anders, supra note 154, at 2. The FEA was only authorized for two years, likely indicating
Congress’s uncertainty about the best way to organize the federal energy bureaucracy. Id.
156. Id.
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efforts, including those related to the promotion of nuclear power.157 The Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission (NRC), a successor agency to the Atomic Energy
Commission, would manage safety aspects of nuclear-power regulation.158 Fi-
nally, the Act created an Energy Resources Council in the Executive Office of the
President to coordinate energy activities across agencies.159
This proliferation of energy agencies led, perhaps inevitably, to a consolida-
tory countermovement. In the DOE Act, most of the energy authorities dis-
persed among new agencies in the early 1970s were centralized, at President
Carter’s urging, in the new cabinet-level DOE. 160 This effort was part of Presi-
dent Carter’s more general project to reorganize government. As a presidential
candidate, Carter stressed his comprehensive reorganization of the state bureau-
cracy while governor of Georgia.161 He promised to clean up Washington and
make the federal bureaucracy more efficient if elected.162 While he succeeded in
passing several reorganization bills, his two most notable successes were the cre-
ation of the Department of Education and DOE.163 His triumph, however, was
incomplete. Congress, skeptical of unrestrained executive power, refused to give
the new DOE unfettered authority over such key tasks as energy pricing and
public-utility oversight. These responsibilities were instead vested in the new,
independent FERC. Today, FERC and DOE remain the two federal agencies
with primary authority over our electricity system.
157. Alice Buck, A History of the Energy Research and Development Administration, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY
1 (1982), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/ERDA%20History.pdf [https://perma.cc
/UG9X-GM45].
158. Anders, supra note 154, at 2.
159. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, § 108, 88 Stat. 1233, 1241 (repealed
1977).
160. President Nixon had sought a similar consolidation of executive energy policy-making in a
new Department of Energy and National Resources, but Congress did not act on the proposal.
Jones & Strahan, supra note 153, at 155. President Ford signed the Energy Reorganization Act
of 1974, which established the ERDA and the NRC and authorized the interagency Energy
Resources Council. Id. at 157.
161. RONALD C. MOE, ADMINISTRATIVE RENEWAL: REORGANIZATION COMMISSIONS IN THE 20TH
CENTURY 95 (2003); Jones & Strahan, supra note 153, at 158.
162. MOE, supra note 161, at 95. President Carter was perhaps overly ambitious in his streamlining
plans, promising to cut 1,900 federal agencies down to 200 only to discover that there were
only about 600 total administrative units in the executive branch. Id. at 96.
163. Harrison Wellford et al., Executive Reorganization: Six Lessons from the 1970s, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS 1 (June 2011), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011
/06/pdf/exec_reorg.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7AS-2HDX]. Separately, President Carter was
responsible for several reorganization plans relating to civil rights, disaster assistance, and
nuclear power. Id. at 2.
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C. Separating Powers
Although it consolidated powers from several new agencies, the DOE Act
was also a divorce decree: it dissolved the Federal Power Commission and di-
vided its authorities between FERC and DOE.164 This decree necessarily brought
some of the previously independent functions of FPC under more direct presi-
dential control.165 The thinking was that such control would not only allow bet-
ter coordination of overall energy policy but would also create political respon-
sibility for some of the more controversial decisions with which FPC was tasked
(including responsibility for wellhead gas pricing and natural-gas imports).166
Senator John Glenn (D-Ohio), a cosponsor of the bill, defended a strong
DOE, opining that the Department’s authority under the legislation was “as
weak as it can be and still afford a hope of getting the job done.”167 Nevertheless,
Congress made several alterations that further limited presidential influence over
energy policy. The most significant was the transfer of electric and most natural-
gas ratemaking authority to FERC rather than DOE.168 Ratemaking is a crucial
function that affects which utilities will succeed and which will fail.169 President
164. The DOE Act transferred additional authorities from other government agencies to the new
Department, including authority over building efficiency standards, the petroleum and oil
shale reserve program, fuel and coal mining research and development, and data gathering
and analysis. Jimmy Carter, Department of Energy Message to the Congress Transmitting
Proposed Legislation (Mar. 1, 1977), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents
/department-energy-message-the-congress-transmitting-proposed-legislation [https://
perma.cc/PQ36-8M9Q].
165. In a nod to the need for independence in adjudicatory proceedings, President Carter’s pro-
posal would have established a quasi-independent Board of Hearings and Appeals within the
DOE which would be “free from the control of the Secretary of Energy.” Id. President Carter
also implicitly acknowledged the merits of some independence in energy decision-making
when he explained why his plan preserved an independent NRC: “Because public concerns
about the safety of nuclear power are so serious, we must have a strong, independent voice to
ensure that safety does not yield to energy supply pressures.” Id. The President also noted that
the Environmental Protection Agency should remain independent from energy decision-mak-
ing in order to “voice environmental concern.” Id.
166. See Edward J. Grenier, Jr. & Robert W. Clark III, The Relationship Between DOE and FERC:
Innovative Government or Inevitable Headache?, 1 ENERGY L.J. 325, 328 (1980).
167. See Byse, supra note 19, at 195.
168. 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a)(1)(B)-(C) (2018).
169. To take just one example, FERC’s March 2018 rule requiring that energy storage providers be
allowed to bid their services into federal energy markets will shift business away from tradi-
tional energy generators in favor of storage providers. Electric Storage Participation in Mar-
kets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators,
18 C.F.R. § 35.28 (2018). For this reason, fossil-fuel interests, who perhaps stand to lose the
most market share as a result of the decision, were only lukewarm in their support for the
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Carter had proposed that DOE be given the authority to fix wellhead rates of
natural gas, interstate rates of natural gas and electricity, and oil prices.170 The
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee suggested, however, that this authority
be vested in an independent, three-member Energy Regulatory Board.171 Simi-
larly, while the bill that emerged from the House Government Operations Com-
mittee was more sympathetic to the administration, it was amended on the floor
to give most of the FPC’s regulatory powers, including ratemaking, to the inde-
pendent, five-member FERC.172
The conference committee embraced the House proposal, establishing FERC
as the locus of independent energy regulatory authority in the federal govern-
ment.173 But they also adopted the Senate bill’s approach of specifically enumer-
ating the powers to be transferred from FPC to FERC, with the remainder vested
in the new DOE.174 As discussed in more detail below, one result of this choice
was that FPC’s authority to order certain actions during demand emergencies
was, by default, vested in DOE rather than FERC.175
What accounted for the reluctance to consolidate all energy powers in DOE?
In part, it was a response to the Watergate scandal of 1972 that brought down
rule. See, e.g., Duke Energy Corporation, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule on Electric Stor-
age Participation in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Inde-
pendent System Operator (Feb. 13, 2017) (“applaud[ing]” the Commission’s efforts but cau-
tioning that FERC’s rules “should not arbitrarily favor new technologies, such as energy
storage, over others”).
170. Byse, supra note 19, at 198.
171. Id. A key feature of this Board was that it would be “bipartisan” and its members removable
only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 123 CONG. REC. 15,278 (1977)
(statement of Sen. Percy). Senator Metcalf criticized this arrangement, arguing that the pro-
posed Board had “the appearance of being independent, but in fact is not.” Id. at 15,317. His
concerns related to the original proposal that the Secretary have authority to set general rules
affecting pricing and that the President be given limited authority to veto decisions setting
prices if they were deemed inconsistent with national energy policies. Id.
172. Byse, supra note 19, at 199 (noting that the amendment creating FERC was cosponsored by a
liberal Democrat who favored strict price control and a conservative Republican who favored
deregulation).
173. The other source of independent agency decision-making in the federal energy bureaucracy
is the NRC, but their purview is confined to nuclear power. See supra note 165.
174. Byse, supra note 19, at 200 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-539, at 71 (1977) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted
in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 925, 942).
175. Id. at 201 (noting that no reasons were given in the conference report for the deletion). The
conference committee also declined to give the President authority to overrule FERC rules
setting prices for oil or natural gas. Id.
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President Nixon.176 In part, it was driven by general opposition to concentrated
power. “No single official,” the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs re-
port stated, “should have sole responsibility for both proposing and setting [en-
ergy] prices, especially where such person has a multitude of other policy and
administrative responsibilities.”177
Whatever its source, Congress’s reluctance to bestow unbridled energy deci-
sion-making authority on the President was framed in terms of the separation of
powers. This was articulated most plainly by Representative John Dingell (D-
Mich.), a member of the President’s own party. Congressman Dingell harkened
back to the Founders’ design decisions when he reminded his fellow members
that “the age of the kings expired with the French [R]evolution.”178 “I plead with
this body,” he continued, “do not set up a new king here in Washington.”179
A division of statutory powers was vital, Senator Abraham Ribicoff (D-
Conn.) argued, because “such tremendous economic power should not be vested
in a single official.”180 Division was necessary, Senator Percy added, to ensure
that our government remained “a government of law and not of men.”181 Sena-
tor Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.) similarly defended Senate Bill 826’s approach to allo-
176. Senator William Roth (R-Del.) wondered aloud during a hearing on the legislation whether,
given that “the oil company lobbyists were too close to the sources of power involved in deci-
sion-making,” both “during and prior to Watergate,” new legislation consolidating energy
policy-making in the executive branch might not subject that policy-making to special interest
influence. Hearings on S. 826 & S. 591 Before the Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong.
486 (1977) (statement of Sen. Roth). Byse identified “basic distrust of the Executive” as one
explanation for congressional reluctance to vest total authority in the new Department of En-
ergy. Byse, supra note 19, at 202.
177. S. REP. NO. 95-164, at 37 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 854, 890-91. Senator Ribicoff
reiterated these concerns on the floor. 123 CONG. REC. 15,275 (1977).
178. 123 CONG. REC. 17,306 (1977).
179. Id.
180. Edward Cowan, Some in Senate Favor Keeping Energy Secretary out of Pricing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
17, 1977, at D1; see also 123 CONG. REC. 17,267 (1977) (statement of Rep. Armstrong) (“Mr.
Chairman, by consolidating this power in one person, we are making that person, the new
Secretary [of Energy], more powerful in the energy field than anybody has ever been be-
fore.”); 123 CONG. REC. 15,318 (1977) (statement of Sen. Hansen) (“The bill places in the
hands of one agency an inordinate amount of power over the pricing of all energy . . . . There
is some benefit to having several agencies involved in these issues . . . .”).
181. 123 CONG. REC. 15,278 (1977) (statement of Sen. Percy).
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cating energy planning authority in terms of the separation of powers, remark-
ing “I have done everything I can in the legislative art to weave together a check
and balance system of the Secretary, the President, and Congress.”182
Some members of Congress were concerned about the use of emergency
rhetoric to justify far-reaching executive powers. Senator Lee Metcalf (D-Mont.)
protested that “[i]n the name of emergency—one that is yet to be proved to this
Senator—we are being asked, in essence, to delegate all Federal powers over the
price and allocation of energy supplies to the head of a new department, subject
to the direct control of the President.”183 He objected to doing so “without any
meaningful check or balance over the administrative use of such powers.”184
Such a delegation of legislative powers, he concluded, “may result in standing
the Constitution on its head.”185 This concern was also raised by members of the
House Committee on Government Operations in separate statements attached
to their committee’s report.186 Congressman John Conyers (D-Mich.) supported
the creation of an independent National Energy Board with broad regulatory
powers in order to “provide adequate countervailing checks and balances to the
centralized distributive power inherent in the proposed [Department of En-
ergy].”187
Notwithstanding differences of opinion about how to allocate powers be-
tween the Department of Energy and an independent agency, what is clear is that
members of Congress understood their design decisions in a separation-of-pow-
ers frame. It is hard to write off the separation-of-powers discussions in Con-
gress around the DOE Act as veiled partisan wrangling because both houses of
Congress were, like President Carter, solidly Democratic. Congress more likely
sought to preserve its own authority as a check on the President. This demon-
strates the latent effects of the Founders’ original separation-of-powers deci-
sions—structural separation of powers begetting statutory separation of powers.
182. 123 CONG. REC. 15,293 (1977) (statement of Sen. Javits). Although Senator Javits seemed to
conceive of this check and balance system partially in constitutional terms, the system he de-
scribes is really a hybrid of constitutional checks (between the President and Congress) and
intraexecutive checks (between the President and the Secretary). The actual system created
by the legislation incorporates further intra-administrative checks (between FERC and the
Secretary). See infra Section II.D.
183. 123 CONG. REC. 15,317 (1977) (statement of Sen. Metcalf).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. H.R. REP. NO. 95-346, pt. 1, at 75-85 (1977).
187. Id. at 78. Representative Clarence Brown (R-Ohio), one of only three dissenting votes on the
committee, explained that his opposition stemmed from the “inordinate powers” given to the
Secretary of Energy “with respect to the pricing of natural gas and the interconnection of
power generating and transmission facilities.” Id. at 84-85.
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In addition, some of the legislative statements evince a desire to divide delega-
tions among executive actors not merely to preserve constitutional separation of
powers, but to position administrative actors as checks on one another.
D. Checks and Balances
As described in the previous Section, the DOE Act separated federal author-
ity over the energy system between FERC and DOE. Yet the bill also left behind
entanglements between the two agencies. Some of these entanglements seem to
have been adopted as a sop to the administration in exchange for the creation of
FERC. Others may have been the result of accident rather than design. Collec-
tively, however, these entanglements are examples of the kinds of provisions that
can operate as checks and balances in a statutory separation of powers.
Three such entanglements are discussed below using the typology estab-
lished in Part I: two that provide DOE with leverage over FERC, and one that
does the reverse. These long-overlooked provisions received more attention after
Energy Secretary Rick Perry invoked them in an effort to enhance the status of
coal plants in the energy marketplace. However, they are still poorly understood,
even by agency insiders.
1. Agenda Setting
Section 403 of the DOE Act, which gives DOE the authority to propose rules
and policies for FERC’s expedited consideration, was likely the result of a com-
promise between those who favored the consolidation of national energy author-
ity in the Secretary of Energy and those who preferred that an independent
agency retain responsibility over wholesale energy markets.
Section 403 originated in the Senate version of the bill that emerged from the
Committee on Government Operations. Unlike the legislation originally intro-
duced in the Senate, the committee amendment gave an independent Energy
Regulatory Board authority over most ratemaking.188 But while it removed rate-
making authority from the Secretary of Energy, it also gave the Secretary the
authority to propose rules and policies for the Board’s consideration.189 The
House version of the bill created FERC in place of the Energy Regulatory Board,
but it contained no mechanism for the Secretary to propose rules for the Com-
mission’s consideration.190 The conference committee then merged the House
188. S. 826, 95th Cong. §§ 206, 402 (1977).
189. Id. § 403(a).
190. H.R. 6804, 95th Cong. § 401 (1977).
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and Senate approaches, creating FERC as proposed by the House but including
the Senate’s rule-proposal authority for the Secretary.
In the Senate’s initial version of the provision, the Act authorized the Secre-
tary of Energy “to propose prices or other rules for Board action, to set reasona-
ble time limits for Board action and to intervene in the Board’s proceedings.”191
The final bill’s language was similar: Section 403 of the DOE Act allows the Sec-
retary of Energy “to propose rules, regulations, and statements of policy of gen-
eral applicability with respect to any function” within FERC’s jurisdiction.192
Once the Secretary proposes a rule, regulation, or policy statement, the Com-
mission must act on it “in an expeditious manner in accordance with such rea-
sonable time limits as may be set by the Secretary.”193 This allows the Secretary,
for example, to propose rules governing the functioning of wholesale electricity
markets (as Secretary Perry recently did), which it has no jurisdiction to adopt
on its own.194
Section 403 does not require FERC to promulgate the rules or policies pro-
posed by the Secretary. But it does require FERC to consider DOE’s proposal
and to “take final action,” whether by declining to promulgate a final rule or
policy, finalizing the rule or policy as proposed by the Secretary, or promulgating
it with modifications.195 FERC must check all of the procedural boxes of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act: for example, it must provide for notice-and-com-
ment on a proposed legislative rule and support its final determination with a
reasoned order. And FERC’s final decision is subject to judicial review if an in-
terested plaintiff can be found.196
The Secretary has only invoked Section 403 three times.197 The first was in
1979, when DOE’s Economic Regulatory Administration (ERA) proposed a rule
191. Byse, supra note 19, at 199.
192. 42 U.S.C. § 7173(a) (2018).
193. Id. § 7173(b).
194. See Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,940 (proposed Oct. 10, 2017) (to be codified
at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
195. 42 U.S.C. § 7173(b).
196. An order issued by FERC may be reviewed under 16 U.S.C. § 8251 (2018). Where FERC takes
no action, the APA sometimes permits review of its inaction. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704, 706
(2018).
197. DOE also considered proposing a rule for FERC’s consideration that would impose manda-
tory electric reliability standards on electric utilities in the wake of blackouts and brownouts
in the summers of 1999 and 2000. See Notice of Inquiry, 65 Fed. Reg. 69,753 (Nov. 20, 2000).
No rule was proposed under Section 403, however, and the Energy Policy Act of 2005 con-
ferred clearer authority on FERC to promulgate such mandatory standards. See Energy Policy
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1201, 119 Stat. 594, 941-46.
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creating short-term authorizations for the transportation of natural gas pur-
chased by end users to displace fuel oil.198 FERC finalized this proposed rule.199
The second was in 1985, when DOE proposed a rule setting certain natural gas
prices at the wellhead.200 The proposal asked FERC to increase and simplify its
rate structures for “old” gas supplies (gas already in production).201 At the time,
producers were shutting in the old gas supply in favor of producing new gas,
which commanded a much higher price.202 FERC responded positively, if five
days beyond the Secretary’s deadline.203 It adopted DOE’s proposed simplified
pricing structure for “old” gas, raising the ceiling price on such gas as suggested
to encourage production.204
The third invocation of Section 403 took place last year under Secretary
Perry. The Secretary proposed that “fuel-secure” power plants, defined as those
with a ninety-day supply of fuel on-site and an ability to provide certain reliabil-
ity services, receive guaranteed payments in wholesale energy markets.205 Only
198. Transportation Certificates for Natural Gas Displacement of Fuel Oil, 44 Fed. Reg. 17,644
(proposed March 22, 1979).
199. FERC admitted, however, that the rule was the result of policy rather than neutral expertise.
Transportation Certificates for Natural Gas for the Displacement of Fuel Oil, 44 Fed. Reg.
30,323, 30,324 (May 25, 1979) (“The final rule is an attempt to balance a number of competing
policy considerations.”).
200. Ceiling Prices; Old Gas Pricing Structure, 50 Fed. Reg. 48,540, 48,540 (proposed Nov. 25,
1985). DOE gave FERC an approximately six-month deadline to act on its proposal. Id.
201. Id. Interestingly, DOE placed the burden of complying with procedural rulemaking require-
ments on FERC since “the Commission is the agency which will take final action on this pro-
posed rulemaking.” Id. at 48,546. It argued that FERC should comply with all such responsi-
bilities in time to adopt a final rule on June 1, 1986. Id. at 48,540.
202. Id. at 48,542. While couched in the language of “just and reasonable” rates and “fair competi-
tion,” the proposed rule furthered a political position that expanding natural gas supply from
old reserves and simplifying the complicated gas-pricing system was worth a short-term in-
crease in prices and the risk of disincentivizing new exploration and production.
203. Ceiling Prices; Old Gas Pricing Structure, 51 Fed. Reg. 22,168 (June 18, 1986). At the time,
the Commission comprised two Republicans (Anthony G. Sousa and Charles A. Trabandt)
and two Democrats (Charles G. Stalon and C.M. Naeve). Commissioner Raymond J. O’Con-
nor had left the agency earlier in the year, leaving one position vacant. See Current and Previous
Commissioners, FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.ferc.gov
/about/com-mem/prev-comm.asp [https://perma.cc/6JA3-BPDK].
204. Ceiling Prices; Old Gas Pricing Structure, 51 Fed. Reg. at 22,168. The Commission made one
modification to the proposed rule, making it easier for buyers to renegotiate other, higher-
priced gas contracts if producers sought higher prices for “old” gas under existing agreements.
Id. at 22,169. In other words, FERC intervened on the side of purchasers, whereas the original
DOE rule was decidedly more favorable to producers of “old” gas.
205. Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,940, 46,945 (proposed Oct. 10, 2017) (to be
codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
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coal and nuclear plants would qualify as “fuel-secure” under the rule.206 DOE
demanded action from FERC within sixty days, although it subsequently
granted the new FERC chairman’s request for an additional thirty days in light
of Commission membership changes.207 FERC rejected DOE’s proposal in early
2018, citing an absence of legal justification.208 But it did so gently, thanking the
Secretary for bringing the issue to its attention and promising to open a docket
to examine the issue more closely.209
TABLE 1.
invocations of section 403(a) authority by the department of energy
Date Name DOE Action FERC Action
1979 Transportation Certificates for








2000 Interstate Electric Transmission





206. Id. at 46,942-45.
207. Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 60,134, 60,134-35 (Dec. 19, 2017).
208. Order Terminating Rulemaking Proceeding, Initiating New Proceeding, and Establishing Ad-
ditional Procedures, 162 FERC ¶ 61,012, at 8 (Jan. 8, 2018).
209. Id. at 10.
210. Transportation Certificates for Natural Gas: Displacement of Fuel Oil, 44 Fed. Reg. 17,644
(Mar. 22, 1979).
211. Transportation Certificates for Natural Gas for the Displacement of Fuel Oil, 44 Fed. Reg.
30,323 (May 25, 1979).
212. Ceiling Prices; Old Gas Pricing Structure, 50 Fed. Reg. 48,540 (Nov. 25, 1985).
213. Ceiling Prices; Old Gas Pricing Structure, 51 Fed. Reg. 22,168 (June 18, 1986).
214. Interstate Electric Transmission System; Electric Reliability Issues; Notice of Inquiry, 65 Fed.
Reg. 69,753 (Nov. 20, 2000).
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2017 Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule Rule proposed215 Rule
rejected216
As Byse remarked in his summary of the DOE Act, in Section 403 the con-
ference committee essentially gave the Secretary “a role in the Commission’s de-
liberations.”217 Senator Ribicoff, the bill’s sponsor, went further in discussing
the Senate’s version of the provision, noting that it enabled the Secretary to “play
an active role in all matters before the [Energy Regulatory] Board by proposing
prices or other rules the Board must then consider” and “setting time limits for
the Board to act.”218 Congress thus does seem to have envisioned that Section
403 might be used to enhance the power of the Secretary of Energy vis-à-vis
FERC.
Thus far, DOE has only occasionally subjected FERC to “exhortation and
nudging” under Section 403.219 Although DOE has rarely invoked this authority,
it is worth considering what would happen were it to do so more aggressively.
In theory, DOE could send a stream of proposals to FERC for its “expeditious”
consideration. In this way, the Secretary of Energy could effectively set the
agenda of an independent commission, crowding out FERC priorities to make
way for the Secretary’s own. The effects of such an effort on FERC’s independ-
ence, and the question of whether the federal courts should step in to limit them,
will be taken up in Part III.
2. Concurrence Requirements
Congress also gave FERC the ability to check DOE policy-making. DOE Act
Section 404 requires the Secretary to notify FERC of proposed rules, regulations,
and statements of policy.220 FERC may then determine whether the proposed
215. Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,940, 46,945 (Oct. 10, 2017).
216. Order Terminating Rulemaking Proceeding, Initiating New Proceeding, and Establishing Ad-
ditional Procedures, 162 FERC ¶ 61,012 (Jan. 8, 2018).
217. Byse, supra note 19, at 202.
218. 123 CONG. REC. 15,275 (1977) (statement of Sen. Ribicoff ).
219. See Byse, supra note 19, at 202 (noting that the Energy Regulatory Board, which became FERC
in the final version of the bill, would be subject to such action at the hands of DOE under
Section 403).
220. 42 U.S.C. § 7174(a) (2018). This provision applies to actions of the Secretary taken pursuant
to authority transferred from the Federal Energy Administration, the Energy Research and
Development Administration, the Federal Power Commission, and the Interstate Commerce
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action “may significantly affect any function within the jurisdiction of the Com-
mission.”221 If FERC decides that its jurisdiction may indeed be significantly af-
fected by DOE’s proposal, DOE must refer the matter to FERC. FERC must then
seek public comment and issue a recommendation after consultation with the
Secretary.222 FERC may concur in adoption of the rule or policy as proposed,
concur in adoption of the rule or policy with changes, or recommend that the
rule or policy not be adopted.223 Crucially, DOE may not adopt the rule or policy
in its original form if FERC recommends changes or recommends that it not be
adopted.224 Joe Tomain has therefore characterized Section 404 as “a limited veto
power over the Secretary of DOE.”225
Section 404 has rarely been invoked. It is not even clear whether DOE has a
consistent process for notifying FERC of its proposed rules, regulations, and
policy statements as required by the section. If they exist, those notifications are
not readily available in public databases. The table below compiles available in-
formation on DOE notices and any further action by FERC under Section 404.
TABLE 2.
invocations of section 404 authority by the federal energy regulatory
commission
Date Name DOE Action FERC Action








Commission. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 60501 (2018) (transferring powers of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission).
221. 42 U.S.C. § 7174(a).
222. Id. § 7174(a)-(b). The time period for FERC action is not specified in the statute and, in prac-
tice, appears to be set by the Secretary.
223. Id. § 7174(b).
224. Id. § 7174(c).
225. Joseph P. Tomain, Policy, Politics, and Law, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1247, 1266 n.43 (1984).
226. Incentive Prices for Newly Discovered Crude Oil, 44 Fed. Reg. 25,828, 25,829-30 (May 2,
1979).
227. Id.
the statutory separation of powers
421
1980 Proposed Rulemaking Con-
cerning Review and Estab-




















clarify that rule will
not affect FERC facili-
ties; DOE did234
Perhaps FERC has only rarely invoked its authority because most DOE rules
and policies do not “significantly affect” its jurisdiction. Perhaps it has exercised
its discretion not to intervene in DOE processes out of deference. Or perhaps
DOE has simply failed to notify FERC of its proposed rules and policies, and
FERC has allowed its right to review them to go dormant through inaction and
inattention. In the latter two cases, FERC could invoke its Section 404 authority
228. Mississippi River Transmission Co., 23 FERC ¶ 61,239, 61,506 n.21 (1983) (noting that “the
[Department of Energy’s Economic Regulatory Administration] had previously referred the
proposed rule to the Commission pursuant to the requirements of Section 404(a) of the De-
partment of Energy Organization Act”); see also Proposed Rulemaking Concerning Review
and Establishment of Natural Gas Curtailment Priorities for Interstate Pipelines, 45 Fed. Reg.
45,098 (July 2, 1980).
229. Establishing Natural Gas Curtailment Priorities for Interstate Pipelines; Hearing and Oppor-
tunity for Comment on Proposal by Economic Regulatory Administration, 45 Fed. Reg.
49,087 (July 17, 1980).
230. Termination of Rulemaking Proceedings, 89 FERC ¶ 61,062 (Oct. 18, 1999); Errata Notice,
Order Terminating Dockets (Oct. 18, 1999), FERC Accession Number: 19991021-0183 (Oct.
20, 1999).
231. Reports of Major Electric Utility System Emergencies; Proposed Changes in Requirement, 51
Fed. Reg. 26,399 (July 23, 1986); Reports of Major Electric Utility System Emergencies, 51
Fed. Reg. 39,743, 39,745 (Oct. 31, 1986).
232. Reports of Major Electric Utility System Emergencies, 51 Fed. Reg. 39,743, 39,745 (Oct. 31,
1986).
233. Security Skills Training and Qualifications Standards, for Protective Force Personnel, 56 Fed.
Reg. 21,631, 21,634 (May 10, 1991).
234. Security Skills Training and Qualifications Standards for Protective Force Personnel, 58 Fed.
Reg. 45,787 (Aug. 31, 1993).
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more aggressively as a means of resisting DOE encroachment. Private litigants
may also be able to invoke Section 404 to challenge DOE action.235
3. Emergency Overrides
Invocation of emergency authority has always been an effective tool of chief
executives seeking to expand their reach. During emergencies, consolidated
presidential authority has been defended as necessary to permit a swift, coordi-
nated response to crisis.236 The Public Utility Act of 1935 added an emergency
provision, Section 202(c), to the Federal Power Act. This provision authorized
the Federal Power Commission (FPC) to deal with imminent threats to the elec-
tricity grid by ordering “temporary connections of facilities and . . . generation,
delivery, interchange, or transmission of electric energy.”237 The federal govern-
ment’s authority over the electricity grid was then, and is now, limited, with the
states retaining primary authority over generation facilities as well as intrastate
transmission. Section 202(c) not only allowed FPC to act in an emergency to
ensure sufficient energy supply but it also clarified that a public utility ordered
to interconnect its facilities with the interstate power transmission system would
not thereby be subject to federal regulation on an ongoing basis.238 An original
advantage of the Section was thus to permit the federal government to override
state authority on a temporary basis without any permanent jurisdictional ef-
fects.
235. In one case, plaintiffs challenged a DOE policy statement on factors to consider in licensing
natural gas imports by alleging that DOE had failed to refer the policy statement to FERC
under Section 404. Panhandle Producers & Royalty Owners Ass’n v. Econ. Regulatory Ad-
min., 822 F.2d 1105, 1114 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The court dismissed the claim based on plain-
tiffs’ failure to raise it on rehearing before the agency. Id. at 1114.
236. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 1, at 2341-42 (citing a tradition in American history calling for
executive “energy” and “vigor”); Saikrishna B. Prakash, Fragmented Features of the Constitu-
tion’s Unitary Executive, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 701, 721 (2009) (identifying “vigor, decision,
coordination, and responsibility” as “abstract desiderata of the executive”); John Yoo, Unitary,
Executive, or Both?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1935, 1982-83 (2009) (citing Alexander Hamilton’s
statements in the Federalist Papers that a single executive would be able to act with decision
and vigor).
237. Federal Power Act § 202(c)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c) (2018).
238. See 79 CONG. REC. 10,378 (1935) (statement of Sen. Lea) (“Permission is given for emergency
connections, without subjecting the companies to interstate regulation. With the consent of
the Commission, permanent connections may be made with a public utility for emergency
purposes without subjecting the utility to the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commis-
sion.”).
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Section 202(c)(1) refers not to the Secretary of Energy but to the “Commis-
sion.” And yet it is the Secretary, rather than FERC, that exercises 202(c) author-
ity today. DOE has never clarified the basis for its exercise of Section 202(c) au-
thority beyond citing the statutory section in conjunction with Section 301(b) of
the DOE Act.239 That Section transferred to the Secretary of Energy all of FPC’s
functions not transferred FERC in Subchapter IV of the Act.240 Subchapter IV
does not expressly transfer FPA Section 202(c) authority to FERC even though
it does transfer general interconnection authority under 202(b).241 FERC may
therefore order a public utility to interconnect its transmission facilities with
those of another entity involved in transmission or sale. It may also order a public
utility to sell energy or to exchange energy with such entities.242 Because Section
202(c) is not mentioned in Subchapter IV, emergency interconnection and sale
authority, by default, resides with the Secretary of Energy.243
There are limits on what Section 202(c) authorizes the Secretary to do and
when the Secretary may invoke those powers. Section 202(c) permits the Secre-
tary to “order . . . temporary connections of facilities and . . . generation, deliv-
ery, interchange, or transmission of electricity,” but only in the face of an “emer-
gency.”244 The first type of emergency that triggers Section 202(c) is “the
continuance of any war in which the United States is engaged.”245 No Secretary
239. See, e.g., Department of Energy, Order No. 202-17-1 (Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.energy.gov
/sites/prod/files/2017/08/f35/Order%20Number%20202-17-2_0_0.pdf [https://perma.cc
/9WCW-N9RP] (citing authority under Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act “and section
301(b) of the Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. §7151(b)”).
240. Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, § 301(b), 91 Stat. 565, 578 (1977).
241. 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a)(1)(B) (2018).
242. Federal Power Act § 202(b), 16 U.S.C. § 824a(b) (2018). There are limitations on this author-
ity. FERC may order such interconnections or sales only upon application of a state commis-
sion or a person engaged in the transmission or sale of energy, not sua sponte. FERC must
first provide notice to each affected state commission and public utility and provide them an
opportunity for hearing. FERC must find that the interconnection or sale is “necessary or
appropriate in the public interest.” Finally, FERC may not compel the sale or exchange of
energy when doing so would impair the public utility’s ability to serve its customers. Id.
243. The House version of the DOE Act did expressly transfer Section 202(c)’s emergency author-
ity to the Secretary of Energy. H.R. 6804, 95th Cong. (1977) (transferring authority “under
section 202 (c) and (d) of the Federal Power Act,” which related to emergency interconnec-
tions). Section 202(c) is also not mentioned among the list of sections under which FERC
may exercise power if it deems that exercise to be necessary to the exercise of its other powers.
42 U.S.C. § 7172(a)(1).
244. 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c)(1) (2018).
245. Id.
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since the Korean War has referenced the war contingency in invoking the Sec-
tion, however.246 A Section 202(c) emergency may also be the result of “a sudden
increase in the demand for electric energy, or a shortage of electric energy or of
facilities for the generation or transmission of electric energy, or of fuel or water
for generating facilities, or other causes.”247 Each modern invocation of Section
202(c) has been on the basis of one of these scenarios.
Even where an emergency has triggered Section 202(c) authority, the Secre-
tary’s actions are still limited to ordering “temporary connections of facilities”
and “generation, delivery, interchange, or transmission of electric energy.”248
There is no express durational limit on these orders. But the title of the Section
indicates that its purpose is to authorize “[t]emporary connection and exchange
of facilities during emergency.”249 Upon the end of the emergency, the Secretary’s
authority would thus expire.250 As can be seen below in Table 3, however, Secre-
taries have construed the term “emergency” broadly and have allowed some
202(c) orders to continue in effect for more than a year.
The Secretary has invoked Section 202(c) authority eight times since 2000:
twice in the wake of hurricanes, once in response to the California energy crisis,
once in response to concerns about the availability of electricity on Long Island,
once in response to a major blackout, and once to prevent a blackout in the
246. For invocations of Section 202(c) during wartime, see, for example, Dairyland Power Coop.
& N. States Power Co., 3 F.P.C. 934, 935 (1943) (ordering that electric power be transmitted
between two utilities due to the “unusual requirements occasioned by the present state of
war”); and Texas Elec. Serv. Co., 9 F.P.C. 1373 (1950). Various environmental statutes contain
“act of god” or “act of war” defenses that exempt actors from responsibility for environmental
releases caused by war or unforeseen natural events. The “act of war” defense in the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Cleanup and Liability Act, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat.
2767 (1980) for example, has only been invoked once. See United States v. Shell Oil Co., 13 F.
Supp. 2d 1018 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (exempting an oil company from liability for the response
costs of cleaning up a hazardous waste site created as part of a World War II aviation-gasoline
program).
247. 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c)(1) (2018).
248. Id.
249. Id. § 824a(c) (emphasis added).
250. This alone would not necessarily ease concerns about perpetual emergencies and conflicts,
such as the “war on terror.” There are stricter limits for emergency orders that result in a
conflict with an environmental law or regulation. The Fixing America’s Surface Transporta-
tion (FAST) Act of 2015 amended the statute to provide that such orders expire after ninety
days unless those orders are renewed or reissued for subsequent ninety-day periods “as the
Commission determines necessary to meet the emergency and serve the public interest.” Fix-
ing America’s Surface Transportation Act of 2015 § 61002, 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c)(4) (2018).
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Washington, D.C. area after a generator voluntarily shut down in order to ad-
dress plant emissions.251 Most recently, Secretary Perry invoked the Section
twice to override EPA Administrative Orders related to the Mercury and Air Tox-
ics Rule, which would have required the modification and consequent shutdown
of coal-fired power plants in Oklahoma and Virginia.252 The provision was not
invoked during President Obama’s tenure.
TABLE 3.
invocations of section 202(c) authority by the department of energy since
2000
251. Each of the orders containing the information in the following table may be found at Office
of Elec., DOE’s Use of Federal Power Act Emergency Authority, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY,
https://www.energy.gov/oe/services/electricity-policy-coordination-and-implementation
/other-regulatory-efforts/does-use [https://perma.cc/G5H6-QH84]; and Office of Elec.,
DOE’s Use of Federal Power Act Emergency Authority – Archived, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY,
https://www.energy.gov/oe/does-use-federal-power-act-emergency-authority-archived
[https://perma.cc/4722-YMRJ]. See infra notes 253-260.
253. Federal Power Act Section 202(c) – California, December 2000, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY, https://
www.energy.gov/oe/downloads/federal-power-act-section-202c-california-december-2000
[https://perma.cc/C7DJ-7WJY].
254. Federal Power Act Section 202(c) – Cross-Sound Cable Company, August 2002, U.S. DEP’T EN-
ERGY, https://www.energy.gov/oe/downloads/federal-power-act-section-202c-cross-sound
-cable-company-august-2002 [https://perma.cc/3FKF-M7X7].
255. Federal Power Act Section 202(c) – Cross-Sound Cable Company, August 2003, U.S. DEP’T EN-
ERGY, https://www.energy.gov/oe/downloads/federal-power-act-section-202c-cross-sound
-cable-company-august-2003 [https://perma.cc/PR9C-3FPE].





California Energy Crisis 1.5 months
2002 Cross-Sound Cable Com-pany (transmission)254
Energy availability on
Long Island 1.5 months
2003 Cross-Sound Cable Com-pany (transmission)255
Northwest/Midwest
Blackout 9 months
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At least some legislators realized in 1935 that Section 202(c) contained po-
tentially expansive authority. Senator Daniel Hastings (R-Del.) acknowledged
on the Senate floor that the emergency authority granted to the Federal Power
Commission would enable it to do “all kinds of things . . . without the consent
of anybody.”261 During the debates on the Department of Energy Act of 1977,
Representative Clarence Brown (R-Ohio) likewise worried about placing “this
vast authority . . . into the hands of one person.” 262 Indeed, it is not far-fetched
255. Federal Power Act Section 202(c) – Cross-Sound Cable Company, August 2003, U.S. DEP’T EN-
ERGY, https://www.energy.gov/oe/downloads/federal-power-act-section-202c-cross-sound
-cable-company-august-2003 [https://perma.cc/PR9C-3FPE].
256. Federal Power Act Section 202(c) – Hurricane Rita, September 2005, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY, https://
www.energy.gov/oe/downloads/federal-power-act-section-202c-hurricane-rita-september
-2005 [https://perma.cc/89VS-JL3Q].
257. Federal Power Act Section 202(c) – Mirant Corporation, August 2005, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY,
https://www.energy.gov/oe/downloads/federal-power-act-section-202c-mirant-corporation
-august-2005 [https://perma.cc/L5FC-UYRC].
258. Order No. 202-08-1, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY (Sept. 14, 2008), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod
/files/202%28c%29%20order%20202-08-1%20September%2014%2C%202008%20-
%20CenterPoint%20Energy.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FZW-WNAF].
259. Order No. 202-17-1, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY (Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod
/files/2017/04/f34/Oklahoma.pdf [https://perma.cc/LC63-7595].
260. Federal Power Act Section 202(c) – PJM Interconnection & Dominion Energy Virginia, 2017, U.S.
DEP’T ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/oe/downloads/federal-power-act-section-202c
-pjm-interconnection-dominion-energy-virginia-2017-0 [https://perma.cc/HY9L-M2LC].
261. 81 CONG. REC. 8,682 (1935) (statement of Sen. Hastings).
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to imagine an administration invoking Section 202(c)’s emergency authority in
the face of dubious “emergencies” to make broader changes to the electricity sys-
tem than it could otherwise accomplish: a DOE memorandum leaked last sum-
mer made the case for using this authority to support coal-fired generation in
wholesale power markets.263 Whether federal courts would uphold this move is
a separate question.264
i i i . evaluating statutory separation of powers
There is little reason to believe that Congress has thought through the im-
plications of the statutory separation of powers in any kind of systematic way. In
the legislative history of the DOE Act, members of Congress defend separation
and balance in general terms rather than debating its nuances. It is clear, how-
ever, that key backers of the Act believed that they were preventing single-agency
dominance, in this case by DOE, over energy policy. FERC would be a voice of
reason, adjudicating individual rate cases, making general rate policies, and over-
seeing wholesale energy markets.265 And that is how things worked for several
decades.
But the safeguards of statutory separation and checks and balances are now
being tested. The Department of Energy has begun to flex its muscles, exploiting
its entanglements with FERC in an effort to dominate the direction of energy
policy. In particular, DOE has sought to support coal and nuclear power gener-
ation in wholesale markets at the expense of other generation assets, including
natural gas and renewable generation. This is not the first time a Secretary of
Energy has considered using the entanglements described in the previous Part
263. Addendum, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY (May 29, 2018) [hereinafter DOE Addendum], https://
www.documentcloud.org/documents/4491203-Grid-Memo.html [https://perma.cc/X55T
-8SVF].
264. For an argument that such a move would be illegal, see Sharon B. Jacobs & Ari Peskoe, Energy
Emergencies vs. Manufactured Crises: The Limits of Federal Authority to Disrupt Power Markets,
HARV. L. SCH. ENVTL. & ENERGY L. PROGRAM (June 3, 2019), https://eelp.law.harvard.edu
/wp-content/uploads/Energy-Emergencies-vs-Manufactured-Crises-FINAL.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5ULC-ADUM].
265. Of course, the wholesale energy markets in 1977 looked very different from energy markets
today. The market restructuring of the 1990s has transformed FERC’s role from architect to
umpire. Although FERC still plays a key role in policy formation, see Joel B. Eisen, FERC’s
Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1783, 1788 (2016), it
is no longer burdened with the laborious process of ratemaking where markets have been
deemed sufficiently competitive. On the market transformation generally, see David B.
Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Electricity Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 767-76
(2008).
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to advance the Department’s energy agenda.266 But it is the most concerted in-
vocation of those entanglements to date and demonstrates that a recalibration of
the balance of power between the two agencies may be warranted.
More broadly, the statutory separation of powers and its correlative statutory
checks and balances hold promise as a way to defend against problems of faction
and instability in the area of energy policy and others like it. But achieving and
maintaining a working division of authority is no simple task. This Part will an-
alyze some difficulties with allocating authority across agencies. First, it will ex-
plain why issues of linguistic ambiguity, discretionary authority, and statutory mul-
tiplicity make a stable balance of authority so difficult to strike ex ante. It will
then explore the special problem of executive aggrandizement in relation to situa-
tions such as the one between FERC and DOE in which authority is divided be-
tween an executive and an independent agency. Over time, executive agencies
may seek expansion of their own authority, thereby skewing the balance of
power. At the same time, executive aggrandizement can erode both the authority
and independence of their independent counterparts.
Finally, this Part turns to possible solutions to these problems. It considers
Congress, courts, and agencies in turn as potential sources of adjustment and
maintenance of the statutory separation of powers. Throughout, it draws on the
case study from Part II. However, it also reaches beyond that case study to theo-
rize about the implications of applying the statutory separation of powers ap-
proach more broadly.
A. Initial Allocations
To some extent, any legislative balancing of statutory authorities will be im-
precise and imperfect. The legislative statements detailed in Part II suggest that
Congress has only a rough notion of the statutory separation of powers when it
delegates. As a result, its allocations are unlikely to be exact by any metric. This
will be true regardless of the precise balance Congress seeks to strike. And even
266. Nearly two decades ago, President Clinton’s Energy Secretary, Bill Richardson, sought com-
ment on whether to initiate a rulemaking under DOE Act Section 403 to require FERC to issue
mandatory electric-reliability standards. Interstate Electric Transmission System; Electric Re-
liability Issues; Notice of Inquiry, 65 Fed. Reg. 69,753 (Nov. 20, 2000). Secretary Richardson
ultimately chose not to initiate such a rulemaking, and in 2005 Congress expressly authorized
FERC to approve electric reliability standards. Energy Policy Act of 2005 §§ 1211, 1291, 16
U.S.C. § 824o; 42 U.S.C. § 16,481.
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if Congress sought to calibrate interagency authorities with precision, it would
find it difficult to do so using conventional tools of statutory drafting.267
There are three primary reasons for this inevitable imprecision. First is the
problem of linguistic ambiguity, which makes it difficult for Congress to clearly
fix allocations of authority between agencies.268 Consider Section 404 of the
DOE Act, which gives FERC veto authority over DOE policies and rules that
“may significantly affect any function within the jurisdiction of the Commis-
sion.”269 The scope of this significance requirement has yet to be interpreted by
the agencies themselves or by the federal courts. In other contexts, the term “sig-
nificant” poses a challenge to interpreters. In environmental law, for example,
courts and agencies have clashed over the meaning of what constitutes a “signif-
icant” portion of a species’ range under the Endangered Species Act270 and how
to assess a “significant” contribution to nonattainment of air quality in a down-
wind state under the Clean Air Act.271 Whether the “significance” requirement
in Section 404 of the Federal Power Act is read broadly or narrowly will either
diminish or enlarge FERC’s check on DOE authority.
Second is the problem of discretionary authority. To preserve flexibility, Con-
gress sometimes phrases its agency checks in permissive rather than mandatory
terms. In Section 404 of the DOE Act, for example, Congress left FERC room to
decline to exercise its veto authority. The statute allows FERC, “in its discretion,”
to determine, within a period of time set by the Secretary, whether one of its
functions may be significantly affected by a proposed policy or rule.272 FERC
267. Magill cautions that the incentives of various governmental actors are notoriously difficult to
determine. Magill, supra note 64, at 631. If Congress is unable to correctly identify the tenden-
cies of various administrative actors, its ability to achieve a particular balance of authority will
be even more difficult.
268. This is true even under the best of conditions, and statutory precision may not always reflect
the best of conditions. See Alfred C. Aman, Institutionalizing the Energy Crisis: Some Structural
and Procedural Lessons, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 491, 525 (1980) (“The DOE Act was not sufficiently
clear when it came to defining the relationship between the Secretary and the Commission in
general.”).
269. 42 U.S.C. § 7174(a) (2018). There are certain other limitations on FERC’s veto authority, as
discussed in Part III.
270. See Alexandra Kamel, Size, Biology, and Culture: Persistence as an Indicator of Significant Portions
of Range Under the Endangered Species Act, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 525, 534-35 (2010) (observing that
“the meaning of ‘significant’ remains unclear”).
271. See Nathan J. Brodeur, Michigan v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 275,
280 (2001) (discussing the relationship between the term “significance” and consideration of
control costs).
272. 42 U.S.C. § 7174(a) (2018).
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may determine that its functions are not so affected, and may perhaps decline to
make a determination altogether.273
Shortly after the DOE Act’s passage, at least one commentator believed that
Section 404 would be a potent defense against DOE overreach. Writing in 1980,
Alfred Aman argued that FERC could use its authority under the Section to
“substantially offset” power granted to DOE.274 But Congress could not predict
in 1977 how aggressive FERC would be in asserting its prerogative, nor how de-
fensive DOE might be in resisting aggressive FERC interpretations. As a result,
Congress could not know how effectively FERC would check DOE actions under
Section 404. In fact, as discussed above, FERC has rarely invoked this provision,
contributing to the problem of lopsided aggrandizement explored in the next
Section.
In addition, the problem of statutory multiplicity means that any assessment
of the balance of authority between two administrative actors requires a compli-
cated netting calculation. This calculation must take into account various checks
and balances across multiple statutes in a given subject area.275 Consider again
the case of energy regulation. Although Congress established a separation and
balance of authorities between FERC and DOE in the DOE Act, other delega-
tions already on the books may allow DOE to disrupt that balance. For example,
the Federal Power Act delegates responsibility for setting compensation in
wholesale energy markets to FERC.276 These markets determine the revenue that
power generators receive for their energy. Yet, as we have seen, a determined
Department of Energy can try to bypass that authority in order to provide addi-
tional compensation to certain types of plants.277
One option that DOE has mentioned recently as a possible way to support
coal plants is the Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA). Congress passed the
273. But see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (holding that the EPA Administrator could
not decline to form a judgment about whether greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles
caused or contributed to air pollution that endangered public health and welfare). The lan-
guage of the two statutes is subtly but crucially different, however, because EPA’s statute
states that the Administrator “shall” make a determination while the DOE Act notes only that
FERC “may” do so.
274. Aman, supra note 268, at 524.
275. See, e.g., Michael M. Ting, A Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI.
274, 274 (“Others have also pointed out that increasing the number of components can lead
to unpredictable interactions between them, ultimately hindering organizational effective-
ness.”).
276. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d-824e (2018) (giving FERC both the power and the authority to ensure that
wholesale rates are “just and reasonable” and “not unduly discriminatory”).
277. DOE Addendum, supra note 263 (laying out possible uses of DOE emergency authority and
the President’s national-security authority to support coal and nuclear-power plants).
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DPA at the start of the Korean War.278 The Act gives the President authority to
mobilize domestic industry to ensure adequate production in support of the war
effort.279 Although the provisions were initially time limited, Congress has reau-
thorized many of them, most recently through 2019.280 One of the surviving pro-
visions gives the President authority to subsidize certain industries deemed es-
sential to national defense. The President may also require the performance and
prioritization of contracts related to “materials, equipment, and services”
deemed to be “scarce, critical, and essential.”281 The President has, in the past,
delegated portions of his authority under the Act to the Secretary of Energy.282
Secretary Perry has reportedly been looking “very closely” at the Act as a
source of support for the coal industry and for coal-fired power specifically. A
leaked administration memorandum outlining strategies for supporting the coal
industry confirms this.283 It would not be the first time the Act has been invoked
to regulate the electric-power sector. Both President Clinton and President
George W. Bush invoked the Act’s prioritization provisions to ensure adequate
supplies of electricity and natural gas during the California energy crisis in Jan-
uary 2001.284
Of course, any invocation of the Act to support the coal industry will have to
survive judicial scrutiny. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Congress, in passing the
DOE Act in 1977, considered whether and to what extent the DPA might shift
the balance of power over electricity markets from FERC toward DOE.
In sum, thanks to statutory ambiguity, permissive rather than mandatory
delegations, and statutory multiplicity, initial allocations of power will be una-
voidably imprecise. As the next Section will demonstrate, such allocations are
also unstable.
278. JARED T. BROWN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43767, THE DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT OF 1950:
HISTORY, AUTHORITIES, AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS, at Summary (2018).
279. At least one commentator suggests that President Truman believed the Act necessary, at least
in part, because of the supply disruptions of the late 1940s caused by labor actions. These
were the same set of circumstances that led to the famous Steel Seizure Case. See Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (striking down the President’s seizure of a
steel mill in the face of a labor strike).
280. See Defense Production Reauthorization, Pub. L. No. 113-172, § 1, 128 Stat. 1896, 1896 (2014).
281. 50 U.S.C. § 4511 (2018).
282. See Exec. Order No. 13,603, 77 Fed. Reg. 16,651, 16,652 (Mar. 16, 2012) (delegating authority
under Section 101 of the Act to the Secretary of Energy).
283. See DOE Addendum, supra note 263 (outlining a legal strategy for invoking the DPA in support
of the domestic coal industry).
284. DANIEL H. ELSE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20587, DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT: PURPOSE AND
SCOPE 2 (2009).
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B. Lopsided Aggrandizement
Power relationships are dynamic, not static.285 This is as true within the ad-
ministrative state as it is among the three constitutional branches. As political
scientists have long recognized, bureaucratic agents may deviate from congres-
sional preferences over time.286 But the temporal aspects of interagency dynam-
ics have been overlooked and deserve greater attention.
There are myriad forces producing interagency dynamism. Political align-
ments within and across the political branches,287 personalities and risk tolerance
of agency heads,288 and other forces will at times push agencies to expand their
authorities, and at others to retrench.289 These dynamics affect not just agency
authority in the abstract, but the relative authority of agencies among which stat-
utory powers have been separated.
Because of the number of variables and forces at work, it is difficult to predict
how statutory allocations will play out on the ground. Nevertheless, one form of
evolution deserves greater attention because it is in tension with congressional
motivations for separating and checking statutory powers in the first instance:
when an executive agency that shares subject-matter authority with an inde-
pendent commission tilts the balance of authority in its favor. A more sustained
285. Indeed, some celebrate this dynamism. See Huq & Michaels, supra note 41, at 351 (applauding
the judicial strategy of cycling between rules and standards in separation-of-powers cases as
a plausible way to allow alternating expression of competing values). Although Huq and
Michaels do not make the point explicitly, their approach makes the most sense if interpreted
as a series of recalibrations of power between government institutions as a means of effectu-
ating an array of values.
286. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle, Bureaucratic Drift, Coalitional Drift, and Time Consistency, 8 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 111, 112-13 (1992) (reviewing the literature and emphasizing the enactment of
Congress’s use of internal agency design to ensure that its preferences will be reflected for as
long as possible); Sloan G. Speck, Tax Planning and Policy Drift, 69 TAX L. REV. 549, 552 (2016)
(same); see also McCubbins et al., supra note 34. This Article suggests that the structures of
delegated power across and between agencies serve a similar purpose.
287. For a discussion of the relationship between political-party dynamics and constitutional struc-
ture, see Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Powers, Not Parties, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 2312, 2327 (2006), which observes that party competition supplements, and can even
replace, interbranch competition.
288. See MANUEL P. TEODORO, BUREAUCRATIC AMBITION: CAREERS, MOTIVES, AND THE INNOVATIVE
ADMINISTRATOR 116 (2011) (observing that “some agency heads advocate vigorously for po-
tentially incendiary policies . . . while others are content to enjoy the perquisites of office and
prestige of profession without inviting controversy”).
289. See, e.g., Sharon B. Jacobs, The Administrative State’s Passive Virtues, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 565,
568 (2014) (suggesting that agencies, cognizant of their own precarious constitutional posi-
tion, frequently exercise restraint in decision-making).
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reallocation of power over time toward the executive agency threatens to under-
mine Congress’s efforts to shelter some of the administrative authorities in that
area from presidential control.290
The shift in power between paired agencies depends on the factors discussed
above but also on structural features. Three of those features are discussed here:
agencies’ leadership configurations, their political independence, and the nature
of the statutory entanglements between them.
With respect to leadership, agencies with single heads can adopt and execute
expansionist strategies more readily than can multimember commissions.291 In-
dependent commissions are typically made up of an uneven number of commis-
sioners, each of whom has an equal vote. Frequently, there is also a requirement
that no more than a bare majority of commissioners be from a single political
party.292 These requirements mean that independent commissions must delib-
erate to reach consensus and that there will be multiple viewpoints represented
in the decision-making process. Because of these internal checks, multimember
commissions are less likely to agree on a policy direction than are hierarchical
executive departments. This, in turn, makes aggrandizement less likely, or at
least less linear. By contrast, in an agency such as the Department of Energy, the
Secretary of Energy makes policy, which the agency staff then carries out. If the
Secretary wishes to adopt an aggressive understanding of the Department’s au-
thority, he or she may do so.293 Leadership configuration also means that multi-
member commissions are less likely to be captured by a single interest than are
290. We should be cautious in trying to measure power allocations between agencies both for the
reasons elaborated in the last Section, see supra Section III.B, and because, as Magill warns,
there may be a tendency to define such reallocations in terms of short-term rather than long-
term outcomes, see Magill, supra note 64, at 643-44. Yet while precise measurements may be
elusive, we can certainly observe changes in relationships between the agencies in question
and track those changes over time.
291. Such commissions dominate the landscape of independent agencies. See PHH Corp. v. CFPB,
839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016), rev’d en banc, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
292. For a discussion of partisan-balance requirements, see Brian D. Feinstein & Daniel J. Hemel,
Partisan Balance with Bite, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 43-48 (2018) (finding that partisan-balance
requirements have had some effect in preventing Presidents from selecting like-minded indi-
viduals for cross-party appointments); and Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. et al., Partisan Balance
Requirements in the Age of New Formalism, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 941 (2015) (examining the
constitutionality of such requirements).
293. There are some internal checks even within a hierarchical agency. The agency’s attorneys and
other career staff can provide important feedback to a department head, for example. Ulti-
mately, however, the Secretary determines departmental policy.
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executive departments. To influence a multimember commission effectively, in-
terest groups must capture a majority of commissioners.294 By contrast, interest
groups can influence an executive agency by targeting the agency’s single ad-
ministrator.295
With respect to political control, because of their greater exposure to presi-
dential direction, executive agencies may be more likely to expand their author-
ities at the expense of independent agencies. Presidents have electoral interests
in implementing their policy platforms,296 and they may leverage executive
agency authority as a means to that end.297 Whether we call this tendency ag-
grandizement or “forceful . . . assertion of regulatory priorities,”298 it can shift
control over policy in favor of the executive agency.
An independent agency whose political insulation is sufficiently robust may
be able to repel such advances. But this is where analysis of particular statutory
entanglements and their effects is vital. As the case study demonstrates, statutory
294. See Barkow, supra note 6, at 38 (“[O]nly one person at the apex can also mean that the agency
is more easily captured.”); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of
Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 611 (2010); Glen O. Robinson, On Reorganizing
the Independent Regulatory Agencies, 57 VA. L. REV. 947, 962 (1971) (“[T]he single administra-
tor may be more vulnerable” to interest group pressures “because he provides a sharper focus
for the concentration of special interest power and influence”). But see Datla & Revesz, supra
note 7, at 771 (“[B]y the 1960s, it became clear that [independent commissions] faced the
same pathologies, such as capture and poor decision making, as executive agencies.”). Regu-
latory-capture theory has its roots in the sympathies of the Interstate Commerce Commission
for the railroads it regulated. See William J. Novak, A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture,
in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT
25, 26 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014).
295. There are suggestions that this is precisely what took place when Murray Energy, the nation’s
largest coal-mining company, met with Energy Secretary Rick Perry to present their “action
plan” to save coal. See Lisa Friedman, How a Coal Baron’s Wish List Became President Trump’s
To-Do List, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/09/climate/coal
-murray-trump-memo.html [https://perma.cc/68XJ-XLMW]; Steven Mufson, An American




296. See Edward Cantu, The Separation-of-Powers and the Least Dangerous Branch, 13 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 1, 44-45 (2015) (describing growing presidential efforts to control administrative
agencies as a response to the public’s increasing expectations about what presidents can ac-
complish).
297. Presidents are aided in their efforts to direct executive agencies by the large number of political
appointees embedded in such agencies. See Barron, supra note 126, at 1096.
298. Metzger, supra note 53, at 425 (“[N]o clear line separates forceful presidential assertion of reg-
ulatory priorities and presidential aggrandizement.”).
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checks may simultaneously enable executive agency overreach and erode inde-
pendent-agency autonomy.299 The relationship between FERC and DOE is a
good test case for the effects of statutory entanglements on agency independ-
ence. This is because FERC is one of only four agencies identified by Kiri Datla
and Richard Revesz as “most insulated . . . from presidential control” in their
work on the functional differences between independent and executive agen-
cies.300 FERC possesses all seven of the criteria of independence they identify.301
If FERC’s independence can be eroded by entanglements with an executive de-
partment, then no agency is safe.302
Although they do not all work to transfer authority from FERC to DOE, the
net result of the entanglements between the two agencies described in Part II has
been to give DOE more power over FERC’s jurisdictional activities. Congress
may have included these provisions with the best of intentions, but their use by
the current administration in particular suggests that their effect may be more
powerful than anticipated.
First, as discussed in the previous Part, Section 403 of the DOE Act permits
the Secretary of Energy to propose rules and policies that fall within FERC’s ex-
clusive jurisdiction. FERC must consider these policies within a timeframe set by
299. More broadly, a closer examination of statutory entanglements should lead us to clarify our
thinking on the meaning of agency “independence.” Datla and Revesz are undoubtedly cor-
rect that agencies rarely, if ever, exist in purely “independent” or “executive” form. See Datla
& Revesz, supra note 7, at 824. In assessing independence, commentators look to factors such
as whether the agency heads are subject to removal at will by the President, whether the
agency has its own revenue stream, and whether they possess independent litigating author-
ity. See Bressman & Thompson, supra note 294; Livermore, supra note 3; Selin, supra note 7;
Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163 (2013). This
article suggests that statutory entanglements are another potential source of executive control
over independent agencies and deserve greater scrutiny.
300. See Datla & Revesz, supra note 7, at 825-26.
301. The seven criteria are removal protection, specified tenure, multimember structure, partisan
balance requirements, litigation authority, freedom from centralized review, and adjudication
authority. Datla & Revesz, supra note 7, at 784-808.
302. Of course, as Datla and Revesz point out, even independent agencies are not wholly immune
from outside influence, including presidential influence. The President appoints the chairs of
multimember agencies (with Senate confirmation) and the chair wields power over agenda
control, among other agency functions. Id. at 818-20. The President also provides support
that independent agencies may find useful in the form of physical resources or political advice.
Id. at 822-24. However, independent agencies are acknowledged to be relatively more immune
to presidential influence as compared with executive departments. See generally id. (comparing
agencies by degree of independence).
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the Secretary of Energy, although it need not ultimately adopt them.303 This pro-
vision gives the President at least partial agenda-setting authority over FERC. In
September 2017, Secretary Perry invoked Section 403 of the DOE Act in an at-
tempt to subsidize coal and nuclear power plants in wholesale energy markets.
These markets are regulated by FERC, not DOE. But by proposing a rule for
FERC’s consideration under Section 403, DOE obligated FERC to spend months
evaluating its rulemaking proposal and reviewing the 1,500 comments filed in
response.304 In this particular case, DOE’s effort failed in the short term when
FERC declined to finalize its proposed rule.305 However, FERC did open a new
docket to consider whether pricing in wholesale energy markets should be mod-
ified to account for the “resilience” attributes of coal and nuclear plants.306
Second, as discussed above, Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act author-
izes the Secretary of Energy to require the generation or transmission of electric-
ity in an emergency. Emergency, however, is defined broadly enough that a de-
termined Secretary might be tempted to invoke this authority to override both
FERC and other government agencies, including the EPA, that have responsibil-
ity for the day-to-day regulation of power facilities.307 The Secretary of Energy
has invoked Section 202(c) authority twice to allow coal plants to remain open
notwithstanding their violation of environmental requirements and is consider-
ing more extensive use of that provision.308 And he may use the sections of the
DPA, discussed above, to subsidize the coal industry and coal power production
more broadly.309
Each of these moves expands authority granted to DOE in ways that Con-
gress likely did not intend or foresee. And each of these moves does so at the
expense of FERC’s authority to regulate wholesale energy markets. By contrast,
303. 42 U.S.C. § 7173(b) (2018).
304. See Letter from Kevin J. McIntyre, FERC Chairman, to Rick Perry, Sec’y of Energy (Dec. 7,
2017), https://www.ferc.gov/DOE-letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/KBK4-G8UF].
305. Order Terminating Rulemaking Proceeding, Initiating New Proceeding, and Establishing Ad-
ditional Procedures, 162 FERC ¶ 61,012 (Jan. 8, 2018).
306. Id.
307. The Department of Energy memorandum quoted above outlines just such a strategy. See DOE
Addendum, supra note 263. While I do not believe that DOE’s reasoning supports invocation
of the provision for this purpose, the courts must resolve that question for themselves.
308. See Robert Walton & Gavin Bade, FirstEnergy Asks DOE for Emergency Action to Save PJM Coal,
Nuke Plants, UTILITYDIVE (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/firstenergy
-asks-doe-for-emergency-action-to-save-pjm-coal-nuke-plants/520280 [https://perma.cc
/R9LL-T2YB].
309. See Gavin Bade, Perry: DOE “Looking Very Closely” at Defense Production Act to Save Coal, Nukes,
UTILITYDIVE (May 9, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/perry-doe-looking-very
-closely-at-defense-production-act-to-save-coal-n/523187 [https://perma.cc/385U-WM73].
the statutory separation of powers
437
FERC has declined to invoke its Section 404 authority to review DOE policies or
rules. DOE’s aggrandizement has thus shifted the balance of authority over the
nation’s energy mix away from FERC.
In passing the DOE Act, members of Congress do not seem to have taken
seriously enough the impact of statutory entanglements on the erosion of
FERC’s autonomy. During consideration of the Act, Congress was clearly aware
of the value of FERC’s independence. The House Committee on Government
Operations noted in their report that “[a] special effort was made to preserve the
independence of action and decision of [FERC] and to insulate it from influences
from other parts of the Department.”310 And yet the Committee appeared pre-
occupied with structural insulation (including removal protections) and did not
consider the potential effects of the entanglements discussed in Part II.311 Simi-
larly, Senator Javits described the Senate compromise as taking seriously those
who believed that energy pricing decisions be made in a “public participation
process with independent decisionmakers.”312 This independence, Senator
Javits asserted, would “guarantee that prices are not set entirely by those whose
interests are singly directed toward increased domestic production.”313 Again,
however, Senator Javits overlooked the potential influence of DOE on ratemak-
ing through Section 403, and on the electricity sector more generally through its
emergency authority.
C. Adjusting the Balance
As the previous Section suggests, the balance of statutory authority between
agencies is likely to shift over time. The consistent erosion of one agency’s rela-
tive authority negates that agency’s ability to serve as an effective counterweight
to an executive agency with authority in the same policy domain.314 If the ideals
310. H.R. REP. NO. 95-346, pt. 1, at 8 (1977).
311. Id.
312. 123 CONG. REC. 15,281 (1977) (statement of Sen. Javits).
313. Id.
314. Magill chastises scholars for failing to articulate justifications for constitutional balancing of
powers and for assuming that the precise balance can be measured at any point in time. Magill,
supra note 64, at 604-06. This Section takes those critiques seriously as applied to the statu-
tory separation of powers. But Magill’s challenges are less potent in this context. For one
thing, here there is no need to identify an independent justification for the statutory separa-
tion of powers: what matters are Congress’s intentions. In addition, although it might not be
possible to quantify the relative authority of agencies among whom statutory powers have
been divided, we can observe changes to the status quo.
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of separation and balance are to be preserved, therefore, adjustments will be re-
quired.315 But who should take charge of the recalibration?
1. Congress
As original designer, Congress is the obvious first choice to safeguard the
statutory separation of powers. Congress could ensure more effective balancing
of authority over time in three ways: by incorporating lessons from existing del-
egations in designing future schemes, by monitoring its delegations more con-
sistently with statutory balance in mind, and by amending legislation to recali-
brate power dynamics where necessary.
First, Congress might take care to mitigate the problems identified above by
using more precise language in its delegations and by considering the creation
of mandatory rather than discretionary authority within entanglements. It
should also more carefully consider existing power imbalances between agencies
when it creates new arrangements. This requires both understanding the statu-
tory universe in which any new allocations and entanglements will function as
well as considering agencies’ relative proximity to the President. As suggested
above, Congress should take special care in setting up balances of statutory au-
thority between independent and executive agencies. In such cases, it would be
prudent to give the independent agency relatively more checks on their executive
counterparts in order to prevent lopsided aggrandizement. Congress might also
consider expressly delegating interpretive authority over the statutory entangle-
ments themselves to independent agencies.316
Such precautions, however, will not always prevent unforeseen evolutions of
the power dynamic between agency pairs. Postenactment, therefore, Congress
should ensure that any system of separation, checks, and balances it sets up is
functioning effectively by monitoring agency performance. One way to do this
would be for committees with relevant jurisdiction to schedule regular oversight
hearings designed to ensure that statutory checks are performing as intended.
Notwithstanding Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz’s well-known ar-
gument that oversight by “fire-alarm” (in which Congress relies on citizens and
interest groups to bring problems to their attention) can be a rational strategy,317
315. For a related argument regarding the constitutional separation of powers, see Jon Michaels,
An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515 (2015).
316. For a similar recommendation with different aims, see Bijal Shah, Executive (Agency) Admin-
istration, 72 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (on file with author) (recommending greater
congressional specification of independent-agency interpretive authority in order to capitalize
on such agencies’ superior subject-matter expertise).
317. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols
Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984).
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that approach is less effective in the context of structural review. Because prob-
lematic invocations of statutory entanglements can be subtle, technical, and
opaque, civil society actors are less likely to identify and challenge them.
Finally, if it finds that the system requires adjustment, Congress can amend
statutes to eliminate or reword entanglements between agency pairs. In drafting
the DOE Act, for example, Congress might not have anticipated that DOE would
use its Section 403 authority to propose changes to wholesale market compensa-
tion given that it is an area squarely within FERC’s regulatory domain. If Con-
gress views this exercise as infringing unduly on FERC’s authority, it might
amend the legislation to limit DOE’s proposal authority to areas more closely
related to its own jurisdictional activities. Similarly, perceived abuses of emer-
gency authority might lead Congress to specify more clearly the conditions un-
der which such authority could be invoked or to require greater legislative in-
volvement in the identification of emergency conditions.318 Again, even the
threat of such action may be sufficient to bring wayward agencies into line.
Unfortunately, our recent experience of congressional inaction—in addition
to the many veto-gates bills must pass through to become law—makes legislative
maintenance of the statutory separation of powers unlikely.319 It is therefore
worthwhile to consider other potential sources of rebalancing. Independent
commissions might themselves assume a more active role in monitoring power
relationships and asserting themselves to guard against encroachment by execu-
tive counterparts. And the courts will play a key role as they are called upon to
interpret statutory language.
2. Agencies
Agencies too, could play a more active role in monitoring and rebalancing
power relationships. Here, an analogy from the literature on constitutional sep-
aration of powers is instructive. David Pozen has exhorted federal-government
actors to engage in self-help when faced with encroachment by other
branches.320 Pozen observes that government actors possess myriad tools, both
318. For a more extensive discussion of the existing limits of energy emergency authorities, see
Jacobs & Peskoe, supra note 264.
319. See, e.g., Michael J. Teter, Congressional Gridlock’s Threat to Separation of Powers, 2013 WIS. L.
REV. 1097, 1103-04 (charting a significant fall in the number of laws enacted per Congress
since the 1970s); see also SARAH A. BINDER, STALEMATE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF LEG-
ISLATIVE GRIDLOCK, 37 (2003) (assigning each Congress a “gridlock score” based on a ratio of
legislative output to extensiveness of agenda and finding that gridlock has increased over
time).
320. David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2 (2014).
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formal and informal, to restore the “constitutional status quo ante” when an-
other branch has gone too far.321
The same is true of administrative actors. Where agencies leverage statutory
entanglements to encroach on the authorities of others, the target agency can
fight back. In the face of DOE’s recent expansionist posture, for example, FERC
could be more aggressive in exercising the statutory entanglements that cut in
its favor. As discussed in Part II, FERC has rarely invoked its authority to review
DOE policies and rules that affect its jurisdiction. If this is because DOE is not
notifying FERC of such policies and rules (as required by the Act), that failure
could be challenged in court. Otherwise, FERC could more forcefully exercise
this check on DOE authority as a way to counterbalance the Department’s ex-
pansionist efforts.322
Agency self-help is limited by norms as well as by law.323 Independent agen-
cies may be reluctant to disagree forcefully with their executive counterparts, and
especially with presidential policy. As I have written elsewhere, anxiety about
their position within government (both as a constitutional and as a political mat-
ter) can lead independent agencies in particular to exercise a version of Alexander
Bickel’s “passive virtues.”324 They are sensitive to their own vulnerabilities and
cognizant that they have a limited amount of political capital to expend. Con-
sider, for example, FERC’s response to DOE’s rulemaking proposal under Sec-
tion 403 in late 2017. While dismissing DOE’s proposal as lacking any legal basis,
FERC was careful to add that it “appreciate[d]” Secretary Perry’s identification
of the important issue of power system resilience and assured him that it would
“remain a priority” for the Commission.325 Such a conciliatory tone speaks to
FERC’s recognition of the importance of executive goodwill.
FERC’s caution was not misplaced. As discussed above, after its rejection of
the DOE proposal, President Trump nominated the proposal’s author, former
head of DOE’s Office of Policy Bernard McNamee, to replace retiring FERC
321. Id. at 22.
322. FERC would be limited in these efforts by the express language of the statutory check, how-
ever, which restricts its oversight to “rules, regulations, and statements of policy of general
applicability.” Department of Energy Organization Act § 404(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7174(a) (2018).
323. C.f. Pozen, supra note 320, at 27-48 (analyzing constraints of law and convention in the con-
stitutional separation of powers context).
324. See Jacobs, supra note 289, at 565.
325. Order Terminating Rulemaking Proceeding, Initiating New Proceeding, and Establishing Ad-
ditional Procedures, 162 FERC ¶ 61,012 (Jan. 8, 2018).
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Commissioner Robert Powelson.326 If the consequence of checking DOE’s ac-
tions under its Federal Power Act authorities is presidential nomination of more
partisan commissioners, FERC will be limited in how aggressively it can push
back on such efforts. Ultimately, therefore, independent agencies in particular
may not be able to defend against interagency aggrandizement on their own.
3. Courts
The judiciary has assumed an unchallenged role as arbiter of the constitu-
tional separation of powers. Its role in policing the statutory separation of pow-
ers is less well-defined. Beyond setting broad constitutional parameters, courts
afford significant latitude to Congress in assigning responsibilities to agencies.
In the absence of alleged constitutional violations, courts do not second-guess
congressional decisions about how to divide authority among regulatory bodies.
However, courts are sometimes called upon to police the borders of separated
agency powers. In Hunter v. FERC, the D.C. Circuit adjudicated a dispute over
the boundary between FERC and Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) jurisdiction, ultimately holding that the CFTC had exclusive jurisdic-
tion over trading in commodity futures contracts, even those that affect markets
that FERC oversees.327 In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court navigated a
question of overlapping jurisdiction when it found that the EPA and the Depart-
ment of Transportation (DOT) could work together to set fuel economy stand-
ards and greenhouse-gas emissions standards.328 And courts regularly confront
questions of separated agency powers in the context of deference disputes where
multiple agencies claim interpretive authority.329
In these contexts and others, courts could demonstrate greater awareness of
the separation-of-powers framework behind particular statutory delegations.
Many of the questions involving power balance between agencies will present as
326. Gavin Bade, Coal Lobby Pleased as Trump Nominates Ally McNamee to FERC, UTILITYDIVE
(Oct. 4, 2018, 9:40 AM), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/coal-lobby-pleased-as-trump
-nominates-ally-mcnamee-to-ferc/538812 [https://perma.cc/CX2P-YQ8K]; Timothy Gard-
ner, Trump Nominates Coal, Nuclear Bailout Supporter to U.S. Power Agency, REUTERS (Oct. 3,
2018, 6:01 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-energy-regulator/trump
-nominates-coal-nuclear-bailout-supporter-to-u-s-power-agency-idUSKCN1MD2R9
[https://perma.cc/D43X-3FFL].
327. 711 F.3d 155, 158-59 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
328. 549 U.S. 497, 531-32 (2007) (dismissing the EPA’s argument that it could not regulate carbon
dioxide emissions without stepping on DOT’s toes).
329. See Amanda Shami, Three Steps Forward: Shared Regulatory Space, Deference, and the Role of the
Court, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1577, 1597-1609 (2014) (citing several such cases).
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questions of statutory interpretation. As a threshold matter, it is far from clear
that agencies should receive Chevron deference when interpreting statutory
checks and balances. Chevron deference only applies when agencies are interpret-
ing statutory language that they have been authorized to administer.330 Courts
faced with the question of how Chevron applies to multiple-agency statutes have
not reached consensus.331 Some courts give less or no deference to agency inter-
pretations in such cases,332 while others select a lead agency and defer to its in-
terpretation.333 And for some general statutes that apply across agencies, such as
the Freedom of Information Act or the Administrative Procedure Act, no defer-
ence applies.334 For now, given any particular statutory entanglement, whether
or not courts will defer to an agency’s interpretation depends on the specifics of
the entanglement itself, as well as the deciding court.
When interpretive disagreements between agencies concern the proper allo-
cation of authority between them, however, there are good reasons for courts to
favor independent over executive agency interpretations. Ultimately, Chevron
rests on ideas about congressional intent (real or imputed).335 In subsequent
cases, the Supreme Court has opted to consider “the agency’s generally conferred
authority and other statutory circumstances” for clues about Congress’s inten-
tions in any given case.336 Because Congress’s motivation in dividing powers be-
tween an executive and an independent agency is likely to be prevention of un-
due executive influence over the relevant policy area, a court might safely infer
that, all else equal, Congress would prefer to have the independent agency po-
licing the boundary between the two.
330. See, e.g., Am. Council on Educ. v. FCC, 451 F.3d 226, 234 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that the
courts may not substitute their own interpretation of an ambiguous statute for an agency’s if
the agency has been “authorized to administer the statute in question” (quoting Citizens Coal
Council v. Norton, 330 F.3d 478, 482 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
331. See Daniel Lovejoy, Note, The Ambiguous Basis for Chevron Deference: Multiple-Agency Statutes,
88 VA. L. REV. 879, 910 (2002) (noting disagreement among courts).
332. E.g., Lieberman v. FTC, 771 F.2d 32, 37 (2d Cir. 1985) (affording the interpreting agency less
deference than if it alone administered the relevant statutory provision).
333. E.g., Kaufman v. Nielsen, 896 F.3d 475, 485 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (observing that in some cases,
“statutes administered by multiple agencies may still permit Chevron deference”).
334. See Collins v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 351 F.3d 1246, 1252-53 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (explaining that
no deference is given for interpretations of general statutes because the Chevron justifications
of specialized expertise and the potential to achieve unified interpretation are absent).
335. Chevron, Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (“If Congress has ex-
plicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency
to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.”).
336. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
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Consider Section 403 of the DOE Act. Neither FERC nor DOE has been “au-
thorized to administer” the DOE Act as a whole.337 Instead, the statute divides
authority between them. What of the individual provision? Section 403 gives
DOE the authority to propose rules and policies for FERC’s expedited consider-
ation. But it is directed at both agencies, permitting “the Secretary and the Com-
mission” to propose rules and policies.338 Furthermore, the obligation to con-
sider a proposal appears directed at the Commission, not the Secretary. Even
where a proposal comes from the Secretary, the statute states that “[t]he Com-
mission shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to any proposal . . . and
shall consider and take final action on any proposal . . . in an expeditious man-
ner.”339 Thus, in the event that DOE and FERC disagree on the Section’s scope,
a court should probably defer to FERC rather than DOE.
Courts might also assume the primary interpretive role regarding agency en-
tanglements.340 In doing so, courts can prevent aggrandizement through expan-
sive interpretation of agency authority that might disrupt the balance that Con-
gress established. For instance, the courts might interpret DOE’s emergency
authority under Section 202(c) to only be available in a narrow range of “emer-
gencies,” so that DOE cannot use the provision to broadly circumvent FERC’s
authority to regulate energy markets. Or they might read in a limit on the fre-
quency with which DOE can invoke its Section 403 proposal authority. In mak-
ing such decisions, courts should give due regard to congressional purpose as
expressed in the text of the relevant statute and its legislative history. They
should also assess for themselves the effects of particular invocations of authority
and their effect on the overall balance of power between the particular agencies
at issue.
337. See Am. Rivers, Inc. v. FERC, 129 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1997) (declining to defer to FERC’s
interpretation of the Clean Water Act because it was not authorized to administer that stat-
ute).
338. 42 U.S.C. § 7173(a) (2018).
339. Id. § 7173(b).
340. But see Catherine M. Sharkey, Agency Coordination in Consumer Protection, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 329, 353 (suggesting that courts provide extra deference to agency interpretations where
two agencies with responsibility for the statute concur); William Weaver, Note, Multiple-
Agency Delegations & One-Agency Chevron, 67 VAND. L. REV. 275, 277 (2014) (proposing that
courts be ultradeferential to interpretations that are the product of more than one agency’s
actions).
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conclusion
A version of the political conditions under which Congress divided authority
between DOE and FERC are present again today. The separation of energy au-
thorities described in Part II emerged in the wake of Watergate, when skepticism
about executive power was at its height. Today, we see similar skepticism about
executive overreach in the face of presidential efforts to consolidate authority.341
In making any new delegations under such conditions, Congress would be wise
to draw lessons from the past.
The DOE Act highlights the advantages of a statutory separation of powers
as well as its pitfalls. If its drawbacks can be addressed effectively, however, stat-
utory separation of powers offers an appealing solution to the perils of faction
and tyranny that the Framers identified. As Magill has noted with respect to
more complex divisions of powers between government actors and across
branches, “This kind of fragmentation is complicated, even chaotic, but it is also
our assurance against threatening concentrations of government power.”342
341. See, e.g., Jay Cost, Donald Trump and the Imperial Presidency, NAT’L REV. (Dec. 10, 2018,
6:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/12/donald-trump-modern-imperial
-presidency [https://perma.cc/8T73-3RPE] (concluding that the Trump Administration
“represents the apotheosis of the imperial presidency”); Marc Fisher, Donald Trump and
the Expanding Power of the Presidency, WASH. POST (July 30, 2016), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/donald-trump-and-the-dangers-of-a-strong-presidency
/2016/07/30/69cfc686-55be-11e6-b7de-dfe509430c39_story.html [https://perma.cc/9BW7
-22H8] (citing concerns that “[t]he constitutional order set up by our founders is breaking
down”); Gene Healy, President Trump Flaunts the Dangers of Presidential Power, CATO INST.
(Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/donald-trump-flaunts
-dangers-presidential-power [https://perma.cc/5A5N-RCTJ] (concluding that “if there’s
ever going to be a ‘teachable moment’ on the dangers of concentrating too much power in the
executive branch, it ought to be now”).
342. Magill, supra note 64, at 651.
